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COMMENTS
THE AMBIGUOUS, AMPHIBIOUS EMPLOYEE: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LONGSHOREMEN'S
ACT AND STATE COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
By DImo J. Boz~mca*
FIFTY years ago in Southern Pao. Co. v. Jensen,1 the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional the application of a state compensation statute
to the employee of a railroad who was fatally injured while working
as a stevedore unloading hns employer's vessel lying on navigable
waters. Despite two immediate congressional attempts to authorize
state compensation for employment injuries occurring within the tort
jurisdiction of admiralty, the Supreme Court steadfastly adhered to
the constitutional lines drawn in Jensen.3 Subsequent cases revealed,
however, that Jensen did not absolutely preclude state compensation
to all employees injured on navigable waters, 4 although longshoremen
and other harbor workers remained without the remedy of workmen's
compensation. In order to provide the large number of such workers
with the benefits of compensation, Congress, in 1927, enacted the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.5 As drafted,
however, the scope of federal coverage was not precisely outlined
with the result that the extent of state coverage also became unclear.,
Because federal and state compensation coverage appeared to be
mutually exclusive, state and federal courts utilized doctrines known
as "maritime but local," "local concern," and the intriguing, obscure
"twilight zone" to retain segregation between presumed conflicting
compensation schemes. Tins judicial legerdemain flourished until
*Member, Third Year Class.
244 U.S. 205 (1917).
2 Compare Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917)

which held the same

state statute unconstitutional as applied to a longshoreman unloading his employer's
vessel on navigable waters.
3 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 1924 A.M.C. 403 (1924).
4E.g., Sultan Ry. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135, 1928 A.M.C. 936 (1928).
544 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
6 Compare Continental Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 805, 1933 A.M.C. 794,
797-98 (5th Cir.' 1933) (Congress intended to exercise its fullest power and exclude
state coverage), with United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521, 524, 1933 A.M.C.
1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1933) (federal compensation available only when state coverage
constitutionally precluded).
72 LAnsoN, Wonainzs
COmENSATION LAW §§ 89.22-.24 (1981).
[891]
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1962 when the Supreme Court in Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.'
explicitly held that the federal act covered injuries on navigable
waters even though a state compensation statute constitutionally
could have applied.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze closely the developments since Jensen and determine what compensation statute, or
statutes, may be invoked by the amphibious employee injured on
navigable waters as a remedy against his employer. Necessarily, tins
will entail an examination of how far seaward state compensation
statutes may constitutionally apply, as well as a determination of how
far toward shore federal compensation coverage extends. Finally,
since Calbeck specifically recognized an area of concurrent coverage,
the problem of election of remedies must be considered.
JENSEN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
While Jensen has been severely criticized and limited, it has never
been overruled and continues to enjoy both validity and vitality in the
field of workmen's compensation. Consequently, it is necessary to
analyze very closely the rationale advocated by Justice McReynolds
in this famous 5-4 decision.
The basic premise of Jensen is that the extension of the federal
judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"9
coupled with congressional authority to legislate within that sphere
under the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution constitutes
a significantly different federal authority than the mere power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce delegated to Congress in
the commerce clause. In the absence of congressional action under the
0 However,
commerce clause there is no existing body of federal law 1
even in the absence of congressional action under the necessary and
proper clause, the Constitution had incorporated into it a body
of general maritime law which must be applied by federal courts to
cases coming within the admiralty jurisdiction. 11 This distinction
makes it clear that a federal substantive maritime law exists without
regard to any exercise of congressional power.
Justice McReynolds, however, went on to point out that more
than this body of general maritime law was applied by federal courts
to matters coming within the admiralty jurisdiction. Although the
Judiciary Act of 178912 had vested the federal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over civil actions within the jurisdiction of admiralty,
s 370 U.S. 114, 1962 A.M.C. 1413 (1962).
9 U.S. CONST.art. III,

§

2.

10 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917).
11 Id. at 215.
12 1 Stat. 76 (1789).
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it had also saved to suitors the right to pursue a common law remedy
where the common law was competent to give it. Conceding that the
general maritime law could be changed, modified or affected by state
legislation and consequently be enforced in admiralty by virtue of
the saving clause,'13 Justice McReynolds vigorously asserted that this
state power was not unlimited. He then proceeded to articulate three
related, but independent, tests to be used in ascertaining the limits of
state power. Basing the first test on the supremacy clause and the
second and third on the substantive maritime law embedded in the
Constitution, Justice McReynolds asserted state legislation was invalid "[1] if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an
act of Congress or [2] works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or [3] interferes with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations.""After stating that these limitations upon state power were necessary to protect the fundamental purposes for which the general maritime law was incorporated into the national laws by the 'Constitution,15 Justice McReynolds evaluated the facts before the Court.
Pursuant to its use in interstate commerce, a vessel owned and operated by the Southern Pacific Railroad was being unloaded while
lying in the navigable waters of New York Harbor. While engaged in
unloading the vessel, and thereby performing the duties of a stevedore, Christian Jensen, an employee of the railroad, sustained fatal
injuries on a gangway connecting the pier and his employer's vessel.
Justice McReynolds recognized that these facts were clearly within
the jurisdiction of admiralty and thus subject to the general maritime
law embodied in the Constitution. 6 Admiralty contract jurisdiction
was supported by the fact that Jensen's employment was a maritime
contract, and admiralty tort jurisdiction was clear because Jensen
was injured upon navigable waters. Furthermore, the work of a
stevedore was maritime in nature.1'7 The New York courts, however,
had sustained an award to Jensen's widow and children under the
state compensation statute which inposed upon the employer liability without fault and abrogated all other remedies available to the
employee, including those provided by the general maritime law ' 8
Therefore, the question before the Supreme Court was whether or
not the application of such a state statute was invalid to the extent
13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).

14 Ibtd.
5 Ibld.
16 Id. at 217.
17 E.g., Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
18 Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 18

that it conflicted with the general maritime law which constituted an
integral part of federal law under the Constitution. 9
Relying upon the last two constitutional tests previously outlined,
the application of the New York compensation statute in these circumstances was held unconstitutional on two grounds. First, the result
would interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of the general maritime law in its interstate and international relations because
the various seaport states could subject shipowners to vastly different
rights and liabilities. 20 Second, its application would work material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law
since the remedy was unknown to the common law and the saving
clause did not preserve remedies unknown to the common law 2 1 Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 was merely jurisdictional in nature
rather than an "applicable act of Congress"2 as used by Justice
McReynolds, his first test couched in terms of choice of law was
not used in striking down the attempted application of the New York
compensation statute in Jensen.
Within six months after Jensen, Congress attempted to authorize
the application of state compensation statutes to employment injuries
occurring within the admiralty jurisdiction by amending the saving
clause to preserve "to claimants the rights and remedies under the
"2
Reaffirming the conworkmen's compensation law of any State.
stitutional basis of Jensen the Supreme Court struck down this legislation as an unconstitutional delegation to the states of the congressional
power to regulate maritime affairs.24 More specifically, Congress
could not sanction the virtually certain disruption of maritime urnformity that would result from the application of different state workmen's compensation statutes.25
Upon concluding that the 1917 amendment was held invalid because it had been drawn to cover seamen as well as harbor workers,
Congress tried again in 1922 to sanction state compensation coverage
by amending the saving clause to preserve to "claimants for compensation . other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel
their rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of
any State. . "2 While recognizing that the amendment did not
purport to cover seamen, the Supreme Court nevertheless interpreted
it to be substantially the same as the 1917 statute and declared it to
19 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917).
20 Id. at 217-18.

21id.

at 218.
at 216.
23 40 Stat. 395 (1917).
2
4 Kcekerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
25 Id. at 164.
22 Id.

2642 Stat. 634 (1922).
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be an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power because it
was broad enough to authorize state compensation coverage to stevedores unloading vessels upon navigable waters, thereby raising the
same constitutional objections announced m Jensen.27
While the tenor of these decisions appeared to preclude state compensation benefits to all employees injured within the jurisdiction of
admiralty, it soon became clear from cases like Grant Smith-Porter
Co. v. Rohde2 8 that Jensen was not an absolute bar. In Rohde the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusive remedy provided by a state compensation statute to a carpenter who sought damages m admiralty
against Ins employer for injuries received while working on a partially
completed vessel lying in navigable waters. Although ship construction contracts are not within the admiralty jurisdiction over contracts, 29 the accident had occurred on navigable waters and was thus

of a kind ordinarily within the tort jurisdiction of admiralty 30 Clearly
the general maritime law was applicable unless it had been constitutionally changed, modified or affected by state legislation." Since
Oregon had enacted a compensation statute which prescribed an exclusive remedy that purported to abrogate any existing maritime
remedies against the employer, 2 the action for damages in admiralty
would have to be dismissed unless giving effect to the state legislation
would work material prejudice to the general maritime law or impair
maritime uniformity Upon holding that neither the general employment nor the workman's activities had any direct relation to navigation or commerce, the injury was held to be essentially a local matter
constitutionally within the operation of the state compensation statute
and the action in admiralty barred. 3
The impetus of Rohde led to a series of decisions that-continued to
whittle away at Jensen by defining a field within the tort jurisdiction
of admiralty wherein a state could constitutionally provide an exclusive compensation remedy and thereby abrogate any existing general
maritime remedies against the employer. This exception to, or
clarification of, Jensen became known as the doctrine of "maritime
but local" or "local concern."3 Some indications of what the Supreme
27Washmgton v. W C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 1924 A.M.C. 403 (1924).

28 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
29
E.g., North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros., 249 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1919).
S0 E.g., The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 651, 1935 A.M.C. 875, 876 (1935).
81 Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 477 (1922).
32 Id. at 476-77.
33 Id. at 477-78.
S34
E.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 119, 1962 A.M.C. 1413, 1417
(1962).
Hereafter the doctrme used to sustain constitutionally valid state coverage on navigable waters will be referred to as 'local concern" rather than "maritime but local." The
use of the word "maritime" m the latter context confuses analysis because it does not
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Court considered to be of only local concern may be gathered from
an exammation of the decisions subsequent to Rohde: a diver employed to remove obstructions to navigation m a navigable river;35
men engaged in logging operations upon navigable waters; 36 a clerk
inspecting lumber aboard a vessel being unloaded;T an employee
engaged m the construction of a pier; 38 and a cannery worker trying
to launch a small boat.3 9 While holding these injuries to be constitutionally within the scope of state compensation, the Supreme Court
nevertheless adhered to the Jensen rationale and stated that such
compensation neither materially prejudiced the characteristic features of the general maritime law nor impaired the uniformity of that
law in its international or interstate relations.40
It is important to recognize that in the cases upholding state compensation there was no applicable congressional legislation and thus
it was not necessary to determine whether state legislation contravened an applicable act of Congress. The sole question to be resolved
was whether the application of state compensation would violate the
second and third principles articulated in Jensen. Furthermore, proper
analysis of "local concern" as a means of permitting state compensadistinguish between whether it is being used to describe the situs of the injury, the
subject matter of the employment contract, or both. Using "local concern" retains the
underlying distinction made by Supreme Court decisions that state compensation for
injuries on navigable waters was unconstitutional only when the subject matter of the
employment contract was within the contract jurisdiction of admiralty. Compare Ex parte
Rosengrant, 213 Ala. 202, 104 So. 409, 1925 A.M.C. 1079 (1925), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Rosengrant v. Havard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927) (state court held absence of admiralty contract jurisdiction permitted state coverage), with Lahti v. Terry & Tench
Co., 240 N.Y. 292, 148 N.E. 527 (1925), rev'd per curzam sub nom. Industrial Bd. v.
Terry & Tench Co., 273 U.S. 639 (1926) (state court held absence of admiralty contract
jurisdiction was irrelevant in denying state coverage).
See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (longshoring); John Baizley
Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) (ship repairs); London Guar. & Assur. Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Coim'n, 279 U.S. 109 (1929) (navigation). In each of these cases the
subject matter of the employment contracts clearly were within the admiralty contract
jurisdiction and state compensation was demed. Justice McReynolds illustrated this
principle in John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, supra at 224: "No case presents a 'matter
of mere local concern' in winch concur the facts: (1) that the employee was working
"
under a maritime contract
35
Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Brand, 270 U.S. 59, 1926 A.M.C. 310 (1926).
36
Sultan Ry. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135, 1928 A.M.C. 936 (1928).
3 7 losengrant v. Havard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927), affirmimg per curam Ex parte
Rosengrant, 213 Ala. 202, 104 So. 409, 1925 A.M.C. 1079 (1925).
3
8 Industrial Bd. v. Terry & Tench Co., 273 U.S. 639 (1926), reversing per curiam
Lahti v. Terry & Tench Co., 240 N.Y. 292, 148 N.E. 527 (1925).
39 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467, 1928 A.M.C. 768
(1928) (employment held of local concern without passing on question of admiralty
jurisdiction).
40 See, e.g., Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 252, 1942 A.M.C. 1653,
1654 (1942).
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tion to constitutionally apply did not mean that federal and state
jurisdiction over employment injuries occurring upon navigable
waters were mutually exclusive with the line of demarcation drawn
by the Constitution. What it did mean was that once state legislation
modifying, changing or affecting the general maritime law could
constitutionally apply, it was the exclusive nature of the state compensation remedy that abrogated any remedies the employee may have
otherwise had against his employer under the common law or the
general maritime law
In addition to 'local concern" as a basis to validate state compensation for injuries upon navigable waters, the Supreme Court made it
clear that the constitutional lines drawn in Jensen were completely
inapplicable when the injury occurred upon land or an extension
thereof, without regard to the broader jurisdiction of admiralty over
maritime contracts. 41 Thus a longshoreman engaged m loading or
unloading a vessel upon navigable waters who was within the
admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the status of his employment was
nevertheless exclusively within the domain of state law if his injury
occurred upon shore.4
During the development of the doctrine of "local concern" the
Supreme Court considered other cases where it held that the application of state compensation would violate the constitutional lines
drawn in Jensen. Held to be within the jurisdiction of admiralty so
that state compensation was constitutionally inapplicable were those
injuries sustained by repairmen working on completed ships lying in
navigable waters,43 by longshoremen injured aboard vessels on navigable45 waters while engaged in loading or unloading,44 and by seamen.

411ndustrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922). See T. Smith &
Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 1928 A.M.C. 447 (1928); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Ace. 4Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467, 1928 A.M.C. 768 (1928).
2 T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, supra note 41, Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt
Corp., supra note 41.
43John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 1930 A.M.C. 755 (1930). See
Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 1927 A.M.C. 1047 (1927); Robins Dry Dock
& Repair Co. v. Dahi, 266 U.S. 449, 1925 A.M.C. 182 (1925); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171, 1924 A.M.C. 1539 (1924); Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 1923 A.M.C. 441 (1923).
44
Northern Coal Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 1929 A.M.C. 64 (1928); Washington
v. W C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 1924 A.M.C. 403 (1924); Peters v. Veasey, 251
U.S. 121 (1919); Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917). Accord, Employers'
Liab. Assur. Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233, 1930 A.M.C. 760 (1930); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
45
London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109, 1929 A.M.C.
495 (1929); Steamship Bowdom Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 246 U.S. 648 (1918),
reversing per curiam Steamship Bowdom Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 390, 163 Pac. 204
(1917). See North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 174 Cal. 346, 163 Pac. 199
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Within ten years after Jensen it was clear that state compensation
applied to any employment injuries on shore without regard to any
maritime connections that could be asserted; that state compensation
validly applied to an employment injury upon navigable waters if
the particular facts showed that the employee was engaged in actities of local concern; and that repairmen working on completed ships,
longshoremen, and seamen who were injured on navigable waters
were constitutionally ineligible for state compensation.
THE LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT
In 1927 Congress followed a suggestion of the Supreme Court that
a federal compensation statute be enacted to provide the accepted
and desired remedy of workmen's compensation to the multitude of
workers constitutionally excluded from state coverage.46 The problem
before Congress was to what extent it should exercise its authority
to cover employment injuries occurring within the admiralty jurisdiction, both on land and water. Passage of a statute purporting to
extend coverage to injuries suffered on land, however, would not
only conflict with the demonstrated congressional desire to permit
as much state coverage as possible, but might also raise constitutional
questions concerning the authority of Congress to cover maritime
injuries occurring on land. 7 A subsidiary consideration was whether
federal coverage should be extended to all employees, only maritime
employees, or only the employees of maritime employers.
If Congress decided to limit federal coverage to employment injuries and deaths on navigable waters, the question was to what extent it should exercise its power over navigable waters. The determination of this question required a choice of one of three alternatives.
Congress could preempt all state coverage for injuries upon navigable
waters and thereby exercise its fullest power, or it could restrict
(1917) which was impliedly reversed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Steamship
Bowdom Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra.
Long before the existence of workmen's compensation legislation, seamen had the
right to maintenance and cure under the general maritime law for illness or injury occurrmng while in the service of the ship. Although this liability of the shipowner resembles compensation because it is a liability without fault based on the employment
relationshup, maintenance and cure is a much broader remedy than that provided by any
compensation statute. Furthermore, the right to maintenance and cure has not been the
exclusive remedy of the seaman against his employer. GLMonE & B.Acx, ADmnuALTY
§ 6-6 (1957). Clearly, the application of a state compensation statute to a seaman would
work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law. The
seaman, however, was not left remediless like those other amphibious workers precluded
from 4state compensation by the Jensen line of decisions.
o Washington v. W C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227, 1924 A.M.C. 403, 409
(1924).
47 GmmonE & B.AcK, AnmAvrL § 6-46, at 339 (1957).
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federal coverage to the employees excluded from state compensation
by Jensen and its progeny In between these two extremes Congress
could protect all workers injured upon navigable waters, but nevertheless sanction state coverage within the constitutional limitations
outlined by Jensen. The latter alternative was available because congressional action does not automatically constitute preemption of
state power.48
Passage of a federal statute restricted to navigable waters would
introduce a new factor into compensation clamis for injuries on such
waters because there would now be an "applicable act of Congress" as
used by Justice McReynolds.49 Since the congressional purpose was
to provide compensation to those constitutionally excluded from state
coverage, the scope of federal coverage required precise definition
if conflicts with valid state legislation were to be avoided. Unless
Congress explicitly declared that the coverage of federal and state
compensation statutes was to be mutually exclusive, 50 there would
appear to be an area of overlap and Justice McReynolds' as yet
unused choice of law test would emerge to raise questions of concurrent coverage and preemption. 51
Confronted with these alternatives, whether clearly recognized
or not, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.' Section 3(a) was the primary provision defining
the extent of federal coverage:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may
53
not validly be provided by State law.
As finally adopted, the Longshoremen's Act made it at least clear that
Congress had restricted recovery of federal compensation to injuries
48

The supremacy clause in article VI of the Constitution is far from an absolute bar
to both state and federal legislation in the same field. E.g., Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Haber,
169 U.S. 613, 623 (1898).
49 "[Sltate statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Congress
"Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
5o If Congress explicitly declared mutually exclusive compensation coverage, a
fortiori, there would be no "applicable act of Congress."
51 Even if state compensation legislation did not conflict with the general maritime
law incorporated into the Constitution nor impair maritime uniformity, Justice McReynolds had clearly pointed out the supremacy clause by phrasing a choice of law test
which would render state legislation invalid "if it contravenes the essential purpose
expressed by an act of Congress
"Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216
(1917).
5244 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
3
5 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
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sustained on navigable waters. The physical area of coverage, however, was the only clear choice of alternatives expressed by the statute
because the language therein did not precisely state to what extent
federal compensation was to be available for such injuries. Assuming
that the "and if" in the phrase "and if recovery may not validly be
provided by State law" was used in a conjunctive sense, section 3(a)
apparently inposed two conditions precedent for recovery of federal
compensation: (1) injury upon navigable waters; and (2) a determination that state compensation could not constitutionally apply
This implied that Congress chose to protect only those employees
precluded from state compensation by Jensen. However, reading the
same phrase as a disjunctive to the preceding phrase indicated that
the Longshoremen's Act provided compensation for all injuries on
navigable waters without preempting state coverage where it was
constitutionally available.54
The interpretation judicially adopted was crucial to the admiistration of workmen's compensation because each interpretation would
lead to significantly diverse consequences. Under either interpretation, state legislation still applied when constitutionally valid, and
federal compensation was the only remedy in the field excluded from
state compensation. Thus a congressional purpose to provide compensation to those workers precluded from state coverage, while
leaving as much as constitutionally possible to state compensation,
was accomplished under both interpretations. However, while the
line defining state coverage remained static under either interpretation, the line defining the extent of federal coverage depended upon
the interpretation adopted.
The conjunctive interpretation would result in mutually exclusive
coverage between federal and state compensation statutes. 55 Such
an interpretation-that Congress accepted the line limiting state
power as a limitation upon federal coverage-would seriously impair
the purpose of compensation to provide quick and certain relief,
because an employee injured in the questionable area of valid state
coverage would face constitutional questions regardless of which
compensation was initially invoked.56 Obviously, the injection of
54

See Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 30, United States Employees' Compensation Commission, Washington, January 26, 1928, 1928 A.M.C. 417 [hereinafter cited as
Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 30]. Many inquiries from employers and carriers concerning the meaning and purpose of section 3(a) led to this promulgation by the commission charged with administration of the Longshoremen's Act.
55 See Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 30, where the commission charged with
administering the Longshoremen's Act initially adopted such an interpretation.
56 See Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 30, where the federal administrative authority initially believed that such a problem would cause no great difficulty. "Like
other questions arising under the longshoremen's act no doubt the drawing of the line

May, 19671

COMMENTS

constitutional questions concerning state power into the administration of federal compensation was not desirable, especially since the
constitutional standards enunciated in Jensen had been couched in
general terms and had to be applied by judges or administrative
authorities with varying interpretations of where the line should be
drawn when confronted with a particular set of facts.
This contrasts with a disjunctive interpretation that would result
in an area of concurrent coverage. Under this interpretation-that
federal coverage was extended beyond the line fixing the limits of
state power without preempting state coverage-the purpose of compensation would be maximized because federal compensation could
be invoked with certainty as a supplemental compensation remedy
by those amphibious workers injured upon navigable waters who
otherwise might have to overcome constitutional objections in order
to invoke state compensation successfully
The other provisions of the Longshoremen's Act did not detract
from the policy factors that weighed heavily against interpreting the
ambiguous language in section 3(a) as limiting federal compensation
to injuries excluded from state coverage by Jensen because they support neither interpretation. In fact the rest of the Longshoremen's
Act made it clear that the extent of federal coverage depended solely
on the interpretation given to section 3(a).
The employees to be covered by federal compensation were not
precisely defined in section 2(3) 57 The negative language used in this
provision included all employees except those specifically excluded:
The term "employee" does not include a master or member of a crew
of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload
or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.5

It was clear that Congress intended by this language to extend coverage to employees to whom state compensation was unavailable under
the Jensen line of decisions. However, by precisely excluding a master
or member of a crew of any vessel, Congress only preserved the seaman's action for negligence under the Jones Act5 9 and his traditional
remedy of maintenance and cure, 60 while it abrogated the longshorebetween Federal and State jurisdiction will still be the subject of decisions by the courts
and ultimately by the Supreme Court of the United States. Until such authoritative
decisions are rendered the Commission invites conference and the co-operation by State
authorities in the interpretation of both Federal and State compensation laws to the
end that conflict may be avoided and the best interests of the beneficiaries and of the
orderly admmistration of Federal and State legislation may be served." Id. at 422.
5744 Stat. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1964).
58 Ibid.
5941 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
60 See text accompanying note 45 supra.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

man's remedy as a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act.01
Hence many employees were included under this provision who
were also already within the coverage of state compensation.
The scope of coverage under the Longshoremen's Act could have
been clearly indicated by section 2(4)2 which defined employers,
because an employee is not entitled to compensation unless his employer is within the terms of a compensation statute:
The term "employer" means an employer any of whose employees
are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the
63

navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock.)

Since the employer was to be subject to the Longshoremen's Act as
long as one employee was employed in maritime employment on
navigable waters, even if only in part, Congress could have contemplated that the other employees of such an employer injured on navigable waters, even though not engaged in maritime duties at the
time of the injury, would be entitled to federal compensation without
regard to the applicability of a state compensation statute. Section
2(4) is thus of little assistance in discovering which alternative Congress chose.
Finally, section 5,64 which purported to impose exclusive liability
upon the employer, was latently ambiguous on the extent of coverage
provided. As generally enacted, state compensation was a statutory
scheme supplanting the employee's existing common law remedies
against his employer and, when constitutionally applicable to injuries
upon navigable waters, it also abrogated the remedies available under
the general maritime law (0 Consequently, if Congress actually intended to adopt mutually exclusive coverage or preempt state compensation, it should have expressly specified that the employer's
liability was exclusive of any state compensation legislation. Careful
scrutiny of section 5, however, reveals that the employer's liability for
federal compensation merely precluded the employee from maintainmg an action at law or in admiralty without makng any reference
61 Six months prior to the passage of the Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme Court
had partially offset the demal of state compensation to longshoremen by holding that
longshoremen could bring an action for negligence as "seamen" within the meaning of
the Jones Act. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 1926 A.M.C. 1638
(1926). By the use of the words "master or member of a crew" rather than "seamen"
Congress rendered obsolete the holding m International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
supra. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 256-57, 1940 A.M.C.

327, 330-31 (1940).

Stat. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1964).
Ibid.
6444 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
6
5 E.g., Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
6244

63
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whatever to the potential liability of an employer under an applicable
state compensation statute:
The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee
to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
66
account of such injury or death
Reference to section 467 shows that the obligation of the employer
was only to provide federal compensation as prescribed once the
Longshoremen's Act was applicable:
Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to
68
his employees of the compensation payable
Clearly, as long as federal compensation was the only available compensation legislation, no recovery of state compensation was possible,
and section 5 abrogated any remedies available to the employee
against his employer either at law or in admiralty However, if there
was an area of concurrent coverage provided by the Longshoremen's
Act, an employee entitled to a choice of compensation schemes would
not be precluded from invoking the benefits of state compensation
legislation. Therefore, section 5 was no help by itself in resolving the
extent of federal coverage provided by Congress.
Of the three alternatives that Congress could have chosen, the
various provisions of the Longshoremen's Act indicate only that Congress did not choose to preempt state coverage. While section 3(a)
did not precisely define the limits of federal coverage, the language
therein obviously could not support a contention that the Longshoremen's Act had preempted the application of constitutionally valid
state compensation.69 The provisions defining employers and employees, however, could be asserted as indicating that Congress intended to provide the only compensation remedy to all employees
injured on navigable waters with certain limited exceptions. But the
previously demonstrated congressional desire to allow as much state
coverage as possible precluded such an interpretation in the absence
of an express declaration by Congress.
Even though state compensation was to remain operative, an extensive analysis of the language in the Longshoremen's Act has established that it left unclear whether federal coverage was limited to
that field where state compensation would be unconstitutional or
6644 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
68 Ibid.
69 But see Continental Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 805, 1933 A.M.C. 794,
797-98 (5th Cir. 1933) (dictum).
6744
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extended to all injuries on navigable waters without preempting state
coyerage. Furthermore, the obvious result of interpreting federal
coverage to be restricted solely to that field beyond state power would
be the frustration of the purpose of compensation because constitutional questions regarding state coverage would be raised m all federal70
clanns except those brought by longshoremen and ship repairmen.
Since counsel of compensation claimants were less than adept at
recognizing these policy factors and the statutory ambiguity, it soon
became clear that repeated judicial refinement concerning the constitutional limitations upon state power was leading to hopeless uncertamity in determining whether federal or state compensation was
the proper remedy regardless of whether federal or state relief was
initially invoked.
Led by the Second,71 Fourth 72 and Ninth Circuits, 7 the lower
federal courts unanmously held that section 3(a) and other inprecise
provisions of the Longshoremen's Act provided federal compensation
for injuries upon navigable waters only when state coverage was
precluded by the Constitution.74 This interpretation led to the utilization of 'local concern" as a defense to claims for federal compensation75 because these courts failed to recognize that constitutional
questions regarding state coverage would arise m all clais under
the Longshoremen's Act where the facts deviated from prior precedent. Any asserted ambiguity concerning the extent of federal
coverage was dismissed by reliance upon the congressional intent to
provide coverage to those amphibious workers demed the benefits of
70 Seamen were excluded from state compensation by the Jensen line of decisions,
note 45 supra, and excluded from federal compensation by § 2(3) and subsection (1) of
§ 3(a) of the Longshoremen's Act. 44 Stat. 1425-26 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903
(a)l (1964).
71 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McMamgal, 87 F.2d 332, 1937 A.M.C. 36 (2d Cir.
1937).
72
United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521, 1933 A.M.C. 1200 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1933); Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789, 1941
A.M.C. 31 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 314 U.S. 244, 1942 A.M.C. 1 (1941); Baltimore & 0. R.R.
v. Parker, 4 F Supp. 815, 816, 1934 A.M.C. 79, 80 (D. Md. 1933) (dictum), rea'd on
other grounds sub nom. De Wald v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 71 F.2d 810, 1934 A.M.C. 1110
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 581, 1934 A.M.C. 1409 (1934).
73
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Marshall, 95 F.2d 279, 1938 A.M.C. 821 (9th Cir. 1938).
See Puget Sound Nav. Co.v. Marshall, 31 F Supp. 903, 907, 1940 A.M.C. 398, 402-03
(W.D. Wash. 1940).
74
But see Continental Cas. Co.v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 805, 1933 A.M.C. 794, 79798 (5th Cir. 1933) (dictum). Compare m the same circuit, T. J. Moss Tie Co.v. Tanner,
44 F.2d 928, 930-31, 1931 A.M.C. 478, 481-83 (5th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S.
829 (1931).
75 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McMamgal, 87 F.2d 332, 334-35, 1937 A.M.C. 36,
40-41 (2d Cir. 1937); United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521, 524-25, .1933
A.M.C. 1200, 1206-07 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1933). See Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Marshall, 95 F.2d 279, 280, 1938 A.M.C. 821, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1938).
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state compensation. 76 Additional reliance was placed upon dicta of
the Supreme Court, 77 upon the erroneous assumption that mutually
exclusive coverage was necessary m order to give effect to section 5,78
and upon the unarticulated and incorrect assumption that congressional action concerning
all injuries on navigable waters automatically
79
meant preemption.
Compared to its use as a defense in claims for federal compensation, the doctrine of "local concern" continued to be relied upon by
claimants seeking state compensation. The flood of state appellate
review concerning the extent of state power 0 was the natural result
of the lower federal courts' interpretation of mutually exclusive
coverage."' Clearly the purpose of compensation to provide quick and
certain relief was frustrated because constitutional questions were
constantly raised before appellate courts regardless of whether state
or federal compensation had been invoked.
THE SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES
CONCURRENT COVERAGE
It was not until 1941, in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc.,8 2 that
the Supreme Court first squarely decided the extent to which Con76 Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789, 792, 1941 A.M.C. 31, 34 (4th
Cir.), rea'd, 314 U.S. 244, 1942 A.M.C. 1 (1941); United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor,
supra note 75, at 524, 1933 A.M.C. at 1205.
7
7 Both New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McMamgal, 87 F.2d 332, 332-33, 1937 A.M.C.
36, 38 (2d Cir. 1937) and United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521, 523, 1933
A.M.C. 1200, 1204-05 (4th Cir.), cert. dented, 290 U.S. 639 (1933) relied upon language
in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37-38, 1932 A.M.C. 355, 357 (1932) and Noguera
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S. 128, 131, 1930 A.M.C. 763, 764-65 (1930) to the
effect that federal compensation had two limitations: injury upon navigable waters and
a determination that state compensation could not constitutionally be applied. Crowell
v. Benson, supra, however, decided the constitutionality of the Longshoremen's Act and
outlined the "jurisdictional face' doctrine. See Gm.moRE & BLACr., Amin
sLA-,Y § 6-47
(1957). Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., supra, determined which federal statute
provided the proper remedy to the employee of a railroad injured on navigable waters.
78 See Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789, 796, 1941 A.M.C. 31, 41-42
(4th Cir.), reo'd, 314 U.S. 244, 1942 A.M.C. 1 (1941).
79 Ibid.

80 E.g., Martinson v. Industrial Acc. Comi'n, 154 Ore. 423, 60 P.2d 972, 1936
A.M.C. 1566 (1936), cert. dented, 300 U.S. 659 (1937); Johnson v. Elliott, 152 Va.
121, 146 S.E. 298 (1929); St. John v. Thompson, 108 Vt. 66, 182 AUt. 196 (1936). See
2 LAusoN, WoannmN's COMPENSATION LAW § 89.22 (1961) for a collection of such
cases.

81 See Dawson v. Jahncke Drydock, 33 F Supp. 668, 1940 A.M.C. 1130 (E.D. La.
1940) where an injured employee was precluded from obtaining federal compensation
by virtue of the fact that the statute of limitations under the Longshoremen's Act had
run while state compensation was being invoked unsuccessfully in Dawson v. Jatncke
Dry Docks, 18 La. App. 11, 137 So. 376 (1931).
82 314 U.S. 244, 1942 A.M.C. 1 (1941).
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gress had actually exercised its power in passing the Longshoremen's
Act. In Parker, a janitor who was employed exclusively on shore had
gone along on a test run of an outboard motor on the James River
and had drowned when the motor boat capsized. Virginia's compensation statute was unavailable to the widow because the decedent's
employer had an msufficient number of employees. Proceeding,
however, under the Longshoremen's Act, she suprismgly obtained
an award. Sustaining the employer's defense that Virgina constitutionally could have provided compensation because these facts were
of "local concern," the Fourth Circuit set aside the award by adhering
to the interpretation of section 3(a) that Congress had occupied only
the field excluded from state compensation. 83
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and reinstated the
award in an opinion written by Justice Black that concealed the precise question before the Court. The conclusions subsequently derived
from this failure to make a penetrating analysis of the actual holding
in Parker have led to confusion and bewilderment on the part of
courts, counsel, and writers that exists to this day8
Recognizing that the Fourth Circuit had sustained the use of
"local concern" to deny federal coverage by holding state compensation could constitutionally be provided,' Justice Black declared that
this holding could not rest on the ground that the decedent was a
non-maritime employee, because he was engaged in a maritime activity at the time of his death. 8 He then noted that the holding must
have rested on the theory that the employment, even though maritime
and within an area in which Congress could have established exclusive jurisdiction, was nevertheless subject to state regulation until
Congress had preempted state coverage. 7 Referring to Jensen Justice
Black stated such a theory was erroneous because the Constitution
limited state power even in the absence of congressional action."
He then proceeded to conclude that state compensation could not
have applied to these facts even though the constitutional lines were
shadowy "IHowever, and this point cannot be overemphasized, Justice
Black expressly stated that the Court was not deciding the question
of whether or not state compensation could constitutionally apply to
these facts:
What we are called upon to decide is not of constitutional magm•ude. For, regardless of whether or not the limitation on the power of
83 Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789, 1941 A.M.C. 31 (4th Cir. 1941).
84
See Gri, onn & BLAco,, ADumuALY § 6-49, at 347-48 (1957).
85
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 246, 1942 A.M.C. 1, 3 (1941).
86 Id. at 247, 1942 A.M.C. at 3.
871d. at 247, 1942 A.M.C. at 4.
88 Id. at 247-48, 1942 A.M.C. at 4.
89 Id. at 248, 1942 A.M.C. at 4.
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states set out in the Jensen case is to be accepted, it is not doubted

that Congress could constitutionally have provided for recovery under
a federal statute in this kind of situation. The question is whether
Congress has so provided in tins statute. The proviso of § 3(a) aside,
there would be no difficulty whatever in concluding it has. 90
This clearly establishes that the only question under consideration
was the extent of power exercised by Congress in enacting the Longshoremen's Act. Justice Black then expressly held that Congress had
exercised its power so that these facts came within the coverage of
the Longshoremen's Act: "While the proviso of § 3(a) appears to
be a subtraction from the scope of the Act
outlined by Congress,
. it is not a large enough subtraction to place this case outside the
coverage which Congress intended to provide." 91
Throughout his opinion Justice Black did not expressly use the
term 'local concern," and thus did not further refine the issue as being
whether or not a defense predicated upon 'local concern" could be
asserted to defeat a clain for federal compensation. Nevertheless,
Justice Black did indicate that such a defense was unavailable against
a claimant seeking federal compensation whose claim under a state
act might have raised constitutional questions by stating: "There can
be no doubt that the purpose of the Act was to provide for federal
compensation in the area
beyond the reach of the states. The proviso permitting recovery only where compensation 'may not validly
be provided by State law' cannot be read in a manner that would
defeat this purpose."91 Subsequent courts and counsel of compensation claimants have failed to recognize the significance of Justice
Black's language. 3 It is indisputable, however, that Justice Black considered "local concern" to be an irrelevant factor m federal compensation proceedings because he forcefully stated that Congress had not
accepted the Jensen line of demarcation on state power as a limitation
on federal coverage:
An interpretation which would enlarge or contract the effect of the
proviso in accordance with whether this Court rejected or reaffirmed
the constitutional basis of the Jensen and its compamon cases cannot
be acceptable. The result of such an interpretation would be to subject the scope of protection that Congress wished to provide, to uncertainties that Congress wished to avod. 94
N Id.at 248, 1942 A.M.C. at 5.
9'Id. at 249, 1942 A.M.C. at 5.
92 Id. at 249-50, 1942 A.M.C. at 5-6.
93
See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 149 F.2d 853, 1945 A.M.C. 878
(5th Cir. 1945); Travelers Ins. Co. v. McMamugal, 139 F.2d 949, 1944 A.M.C. 377 (4th
Cir. 1944). See also GnmonE & BLAck, AD nuLTY § 6-49, at 348 (1957).
94
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 250, 1942 A.M.C. 1, 6 (1941).
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Properly analyzed, Parker held that Congress had exercised its power
so that constitutional adjudications of state power were unnecessary
in deciding clamis under the Longshoremen's Act because federal
coverage had not been restricted to the field beyond constitutionally
valid state coverage.
Did denying the use of 'local concern" to defeat a claim for federal compensation mean that Congress had exercised its power to the
fullest extent and thereby preempted all state coverage? Justice Black
neither posed such a question nor clearly directed attention to its
presence. However, he declared that state compensation had not been
preempted because the Longshoremen's Act demed state coverage
only if it would conflict with the Constitution:
The main impetus for the
Act was the need to correct a gap
made plain by decisions of this Court. We believe that there is only
one interpretation of the proviso in § 3(a) which would accord with
the ann of Congress; the field in which a state may not validly provide for compensation must be taken, for the purposes of the Act, as
the same field which the Jensen line of decision excluded from state
compensation laws. Without affirming or rejecting the constitutional
implications of those cases, we accept them as the measure by which
Congress intended to mark the scope of the Act they brought into
existence. 95
Implicit within this interpretation of section 3(a) as a congressional
acceptance of constitutional limitations upon state power were two
conclusions. First, Congress sanctioned the continued operation of
state compensation by inarticulately declaring that such state coverage would not contravene the purpose of the Longshoremen's Act.
Second, although federal compensation was the only remedy in the
field beyond valid state coverage, the use of different lines to define
the extent of federal and state compensation meant there was an area
of concurrent coverage despite the purported exclusive liability provision in the Longshoremen's Act.98
Since Justice Black had stated in dictum that state compensation
could not constitutionally apply to the facts before the Court,97 sub-

sequent improper analysis led to great uncertainty regarding the continued application of state compensation to injuries on navigable
waters.9 8 Obviously, few fact situations, if any, could be more local
95 hzd.
9644 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
97
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 248, 1942 A.M.C. 1, 4 (1941).
9
8Standard Dredging Corp. v. Henderson, 57 F Supp. 770, 771-72 (S.D. Ala. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 150 F.2d 78, 1945 A.M.C. 881 (5th Cir. 1945); Standard Dredging Corp. v. Henderson, 150 F.2d 78, 80, 1945 A.M.C. 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1945). See 2
LA soN, Woman's CoiMENsA TON LAw § 89.23(b) (1961); Gmmonn & BrAcK, ADmmALTY § 6-49, at 347-48 (1957).
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than an injury to a janitor who worked exclusively on land save for
the single time he went along on a test run of a motor boat. But
Justice Black made this statement merely to retain the appearance of
mutually exclusive coverage between state and federal compensation
while actually interpreting section 3(a) to provide overlapping coverage. 9 If Justice Black had held that section 3(a) provided for no
concurrent coverage, the Longshoremen's Act would have automatically applied upon finding state coverage unconstitutional. However,
it is clear that not only did he not follow this course, but his opinion
was devoid of any reference to, or citation of, the unanimous prior
precedent which had interpreted federal and state compensation to
be mutually exclusive. 100
Coupled with his statement regarding the inapplicability of state
coverage, Justice Black subtly used the term "subtraction" to compound his concealment of the fact that he was actually holding contrary to mutually exclusive coverage while retaining the appearance
of such coverage: "While the proviso of § 3(a) appears to be a subtraction from the scope of the Act
outlined by Congress, we
believe that, properly interpreted,it is not a large enough subtraction
to place this case outside the coverage which Congress intended to
provide." 10i Subsequently Justice Black interpreted section 3(a) to
mean that although Congress had accepted the lensen line of decisions as a limit upon state power, it had extended federal coverage
beyond the line fixing the limits of state power. Under such an interpretation, an acceptance by Congress of continued state coverage was
a "subtraction" since preemption of state coverage would have been
the fullest exercise of congressional power. However, Congress had
not expressed a greater "subtraction" because it had failed to limit
federal coverage to the field constitutionally excluded from state compensation. Therefore, within the context of what power Congress
could have exercised, the phrase "and if recovery
may not validly
be provided by State law" 02 was definitely a "subtraction." However,
from the standpoint of prior precedent which adhered to mutually
exclusive coverage, 03 such a "subtraction" was in reality a substantial
addition to the scope of coverage provided by federal compensation.
The failure to recognize Parker as a decision concerned with the
99 Such a statement may also have been made to preclude the employer from contending that he was not subject to the Longshoremen's Act on the ground he had no employees engaged in maritime employment on navigable waters. See Longshoremen's Act
§ 2(4), 44 Stat. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1964).
ioo See GiLmolE & BL.cx, AmDiNwrv § 6-49, at 348 (1957).
101 Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 249, 1942 A.M.C. 1, 5 (1941).
(Emphasis added.)
10244 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
103 Cases cited notes 71-73 supra.
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construction of a federal statute rather than a determination of state
power led to hopeless confusion the following year when, in Davis v.
Department of Labor and Industries,104 the Supreme Court created
the "twilight zone" 105 while granting recovery of state compensation
on facts much less local in nature than those in Parker 0 In Davis
a structural steelworker, engaged in the dismantling of an intrastate
bridge over a navigable river, drowned when he fell or was knocked
into the river from the barge on winch he was working. His duties
at the time of the accident had been to examine the steel after it had
been lowered onto the barge and to cut the pieces to proper lengths
for purposes of storage. Seeking the benefits of state compensation,
his widow proceeded against the employer who had complied only
with the state statute which purported to cover all employees engaged
m maritime occupations for whom no right or obligation existed under
the maritime law '"0After making the crucial characterization that
the decedent's duties were the loading of a vessel on navigable waters,
and thus a 'longshoreman" directly within the ambit of Jensen,08 the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed three lower tribunals and denied
recovery on the ground that the state could not constitutionally make
a compensation award on these facts. 0 9 Speaking again through
Justice- Black, the Supreme Court reversed with only one dissent on
the ground that the Constitution was no bar to the recovery of state
compensation because these facts came within a "twilight zone."
Since Davis was the first Supreme Court decision to allow recovery
of state compensation for an employment injury on navigable waters
after passage of the Longshoremen's Act, it laid to rest any contention
that Congress had abrogated the operation of state compensation for
such mnes. This was consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Longshoremen's Act in Parker and was also supported
by pre-Parkerlitigation in the state courts." 0 Thus the question pre104 317 U.S. 249, 1942 A.M.C. 1653 (1942).
105 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256,

1942 A.M.C. 1653, 1657-58

(1942).
0
3 6 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. MoMamgal, 139 F.2d 949, 951, 1944 A.M.C. 377,
381 (4th Cir. 1944); GrmoE & BLAcK, ADNimtALY § 6-49, at 349 (1957).
107 WASH. 1REv. CODE § 51.12.100 (1961).
108 "Appellants claun for pension was rejected on the ground that Davis was, at
the time of his accident, engaged in the performance of a maritime service upon
navigable waters, the theory being that the state has no jurisdiction over such accidents,
and that they are not within the purview of the industrial insurance act.
That he
was so engaged is hardly debatable." Davis v. Department of Labor, 12 Wash. 2d 349,
351, 121 P.2d 365, 366, 1942 A.M.C. 304, 305 (1942).
109 "The accident occurred while Davis was working as a stevedore on a vessel
in navigable waters.
The fact that he may have been employed as a structural
steel worker is immaterial." Id. at 353-54, 121 P.2d at 367, 1942 A.M.C. at 306.
0
1 See cases note 80 supra.
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sented m Davis was the same as that presented by state claims prior
to the enactment of the Longshoremen's Act: whether or not the
Constitution was a bar to the recovery of state compensation.1 This
contrasts with the radically different question in Parker which involved the interpretation of a statute passed by Congress. 112
While prior to Davis "local concern" had evolved as a basis to
sustain the application of state compensation to muries upon navigable waters, Davis allowed recovery of state compensation if it came
within a "twilight zone."" 3 The first question that arises is whether
the "twilight zone" was a new concept or merely "local concern'
under a new label. Justice Black clearly set the stage for the declaration of a new concept by expressing dissatisfaction with the results of
'local concern"
When a state could and when it could not, grant protection under a
compensation act was left as a perplexing problem, for it was held
"difficult, if not impossible," to define this boundary with exactness.
[E]mployees such as decedent here occupy that shadowy area
within which, at some undefined and undefinable point, state laws
can validly provide compensation. This Court has been unable to give
any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state power in
advance of litigation.
The determination of particular cases, of
which there have been a great many, has become extremely difficult.
It is fair to say that a number of cases can be cited both in behalf of
and in opposition to recovery here.
The very closeness of the cases cited.
has caused much serious
confusion.' 14

In order to relieve an injured employee of the undesirable burden
of predetermining constitutional questions regarding state coverage
over which appellate judges regularly divided, Justice Black purported to obliterate further use of 'local concern" by declaring that
the application of state compensation was a question of fact that
"11 "A line of opinions of this Court, begining with
Jensen
held that under
some circumstances states could, but under others could not, consistently with
the
Federal Constitution, apply their compensation laws to maritime employees.
[Elmployees such as decedent here, occupy that shadowy area within which,
at some undefined and undefinable point, state laws can validly provide compensation." Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 252-53, 1942 A.M.C. 1653, 1654-55

(1942).

1i2 "What we are called upon to decide is not of constitutional magnitude.
Congress could constitutionally have provided for recovery under a federal statute in
this and of situation. The question is whether Congress has so provided m this statute."
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 248, 1942 A.M.C. 1, 5 (1941).
113 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256, 1942 A.M.C. 1653, 1657-58

(1942).
314

Id. at 252-54, 1942 A.M.C. at 1654-56.
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should be decided immediately rather than a question of constitutional law to be answered by appellate reviewIt must be remembered that under the Jensen hypothesis, basic conditions are factual: Does the state law "interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of" maritime law? Yet, employees are asked to
determine with certainty before bringing their actions that factual
question over which courts regularly divide among themselves and
within their own membersnp.ii 5
Justice Black then proceeded to proclaim the "twilight zone" to justify
the determination of this question of fact at the administrative level:
There is
clearly a twilight zone in which the employees must
have their rights determined case by case, and in which particular
facts and circumstances are vital elements. That zone includes persons
such as the decedent who are, as a matter of actual administration, in
fact protected under the state compensation act. ni °
In order to insure the greatest number of administrative factual
findings in favor of state coverage once state compensation proceedings had been initiated, Justice Black pointed to two propositions that
would facilitate such findings. First, the state compensation statute
invoked must be presumed to be constitutional as applied." 7 Second,
a reasonable characterization of the employee's duties at the time

of m]ury which would support a finding that the employee came
within the coverage of the state statute should be accepted at the

administrative level. While this second proposition was not expressly
set forth by Justice Black, it necessarily followed from the Supreme
Court's decision granting state recovery in Davis without overruling
Jensen which had demed state coverage to a railroad employee characterized as a stevedore injured on navigable waters."

8

Therefore, an

employee aiding in dismantling an intrastate bridge while piling steel
on a barge should not have been characterized by the Washington
courts as a stevedore engaged in loading a vessel on navigable waters
because it had been an unwarranted factual basis for denying state
compensation." 9 The interaction of these two factors results in a conclusion that the only question of law that could arise for state
appellate review is whether or not the particular facts would be such
that the presumption of constitutionality were unwarranted. Justice
Black indicated that an appeal would be futile unless the decision of
,15Id. at 254, 1942 A.M.C. at 1656.
116 Id. at 256, 1942 A.M.C. at 1657-58.
117 "Faced with this factual problem we must give great-indeed, presumptivestate statutes themselves." Id. at 256, 1942 A.M.C. at 1658.
weight to the
"Southern
118 "The work of a stevedore in which the deceased was engaging
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917).
19 See text in notes 108, 109 supra.
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the admimstrative authority were obviously erroneous. Clearly this
would lead to virtual finality at the administrative level:
Under all the circumstances of this case, we will rely on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of this state enactment; for any contrary decision results in our holding the Washington act unconstitutional as applied to this petitioner. A conclusion of unconstitutionality
of a state statute cannot be rested on so hazardous a factual foundation here, any more than in the other cases cited.
Giving the full weight to the presumption, and resolving all
doubts in favor of the Act, we hold
that the Constitution is no ob120
stacle to the petitioner's recovery.
Soon after Davis two per curiain opinions of the Supreme Court
illustrated the proposition that a reasonable characterization of the
employee's duties at the time of hIs injury should not be rejected if
it would preclude state coverage. Both in Mooress Case'21 and Baskin
v. Industrial Acc. Comnn 22 a shipyard worker primarily employed
on land had been injured on navigable waters while aboard a vessel
being repaired. Classified as a rigger rather than a carpenter, Moores
was directing other workers transferring materials from shore to the
vessel at the time of his injury 1 Baskin also was not a carpenter. At
the time of his injury he was engaged as a matenalman helping carry
planks from one hold to another.' 24 Thus, although neither employee
was actually a ship repairman per se at the time of his injury, both
were engaged in the performance of their employers' maritime contracts to repair a vessel. Recognizing that shp repairmen were constitutionally precluded from state compensation according to prior
precedent,125 the Massachusetts court in Moores'snevertheless sustained
state coverage by heavily relying upon Davis.126 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court the decision was affirmed per curiam with a citation
to Davis. 2 In Baskin, however, a California appellate court summarily rejected the employee's contention that he was not a carpenter
on the ground that as a materialman "he was just as much engaged
i20 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 258, 1942 A.M.C. 1653, 1659
(1942).
121 323 Mass. 462, 80 N.E.2d 478, 1948 A.M.C. 1862, aff'd per curtam sub nor.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
122 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549 (1949), rev'd per curtam, 338 U.S. 854
(1949).
123 Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 164, 80 N.E.2d 478, 479, 1948 A.M.C. 1862,
1863 (1948).
124 Baskm v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 :.2d 549, 550
(1949).25
' Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 165-66, 80 N.E.2d 478, 479-80, 1948 A.M.C.
1862, 1863-64 (1948).
126 Id. at 166-68, 80 N.E.2d at 480-81, 1948 A.M.C. at 1864-66 (1948).
127
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948) (per cunam).
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the performance of his employer's maritime contract as was the
joiner who did the carpentry, albeit of humbler station." 28 Following
the denial of state compensation on the ground that ship repairmen
could not be in the "twilight zone" because prior precedent was
clear, 29 the Supreme Court, on granting certiorari, vacated and remanded per curiam with citations to Davis and Moores's.130
The mode of disposition by the Supreme Court in Moores's and
Baskin was very unsatisfactory because it led to erroneous conclusions, especially since an overly broad reading of these two per curam
decisions made it appear that state courts could disregard prior precedent concerning constitutional limitations upon state power.:31 Furthermore, the confusion generated by unproper analysis of Justice
Black's opinions m Parker and Davis was increased rather than clanfled. 132 Close scrutiny, however, of the facts in Moores's and Baskin
makes it clear that the only relevant factual distinction between these
two cases and Davis is that the employer's contract was maritime in
the former and non-maritime in the latter.133 Therefore, Moores's and
Baskin merely illustrate that the Supreme Court abdicated its judicial
duty to provide an intelligible guideline by failing to articulate what
was implicit in Davis: conceding prior precedent denying state coverage and the maritime nature of the employer's contract, a reasonable
characterization of the employee's duties at the time of injury which
in

128

Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 634, 201 P.2d 549, 550

(1949).

Id.at 637-38, 201 P.2d at 553.
130 Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949) (per curam). On
remand the California court properly directed the state administrative authority to take
jurisdiction. Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 257, 217 P.2d 733
(1950), aff'd per curam sub nom. Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 340 U.S. 886 (1950).
1 2 LAnSON, WoRanxmes COMiPENSATION LAW § 89.25 (1961). Such a conclusion
led to decisions that longshoremen injured upon navigable waters were within the
coverage of the Louisiana compensation statute. Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores,
Inc., 95 So. 2d 830, 1957 A.M.C. 2246 (La. Ct. App. 1957), cert. dented, 355 U.S.
952 (1958); Sullivan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 So. 2d 834, 1957 A.M.C. 2252 (La. Ct.
App. 1957). See Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 265 F.2d 547, 1959 A.M.C. 573,
ret'd on rehearng,267 F.2d 218, 1959 A.M.C. 2047 (5th Cir. 1959) where a federal
appellate court initially held a longshoreman injured on navigable waters to be within
the Louisiana statute before promptly reversing itself.
' 32 See De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 1944 A.M.C. 773
(5th Cir. 1944); Travelers Ins. Co. v. McMamgal, 139 F.2d 949, 1944 A.M.C. 377
(4th Cir. 1944). For a later discussion that unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile
Parker and Dams, see Judge Brown's painstaking review of the authorities in Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52, 1961 A.M.C. 2008 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S.
114, 1962 A.M.C. 1413 (1962).
133 While a contract calling for repairs to an existing vessel comes within the
contract jurisdiction of admiralty and thus is a maritime contract, a contract for dismantling an intrastate bridge would not come within the contract junsdiction of
129

admiralty.
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would support state coverage should be accepted at the adminstrative level.
Davis was a landmark decision: it created the judicial expedient
of a question of fact to be decided with certainty at the admmistrative level m order to validate recovery of state compensation in cases
where the facts previously would have necessitated the resolution of
constitutional questions as a matter of law It may be asked, however,
why the Supreme Court chose such an inarticulate concept as the
"twilight zone" as a label for this guideline. Certainly the desire to
effectuate the purpose of workmen's compensation to provide quick
and certain relief did not necessitate such a label. Parker held that
Congress had rejected the Jensen line of demarcation as a limitation
upon federal coverage which meant that a state admnimstrative ruling
adverse to the claimant, even if erroneous, did not deprive the injured
employee of all compensation. He could still invoke federal compensation with certainty without having to resort to review of the admmistrative finding in the state appellate courts.
The immediate motivation behind Justice Black's "twilight zone'
in Davis was the necessity of retaining the facade of mutually exclusive coverage between federal and state compensation. Justice Black
was disturbed by the fact that the employer had complied only with
the state statute. Unless he made it appear that the state compensation statute was the only remedy, the employer would not only lose
the value of his contributions under the state statute, but also would
be subject to the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act and the consequences of non-compliance.iB 4 Nevertheless, Justice Black did indicate that federal compensation was also available if it had been inyoked rather than the state statute:
Not only does the state act in the instant case appear to cover this
employee, aside from the constitutional consideration, but no conflicting process of administration is apparent. The federal authorities
have taken no action under the Longshoremen's Act, and it does not
appear that the employer has either made the special payments required or controverted payment in the manner prescribed m the
Act.1i5
Justice Black expressed the majority position in terms of a "twilight
zone" in order to avoid confronting the issue of concurrent coverage
that had now been raised by the successive holdings in Parker and
Davis.
The fact that every member of the Supreme Court recognized
that there was an area of concurrent coverage is emphasized by ref134 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 255, 1942 A.M.C. 1653, 1656-57

(1942).

135 Id. at

258, 1942 A.M.C. at 1659.
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erence to Chief Justice Stone's dissent, which was based on the ground
that the majority's opinion had made it clear that there was in fact
an overlap between federal and state coverage:
The Court's opinion in the present case seems to proceed upon
the assumption -thatif petitioner had filed a claim under the federal
act, and the federal commissioner had awarded compensation, we
would sustain his ruling, although the Court now holds that the state
authorities erroneously concluded they were without constitutional
power to make the award. Indeed, after our decision in Parker
petitioner's right of recovery under the federal act can hardly be
136
doubted
Concurring with the majority, Jusice Frankfurter provided further
support for the proposition that the entire Court was aware of an
area of concurrent coverage: "Theoretic illogic is inevitable so long
as the employee in a situation like the present is permitted to recover
That
or under a state statute
either under the federal act
or
path
the
Court's
by
reached
it
be
whether
result,
is the practical
137
that apparently left open under the Chief Justice's views."
Although Justice Frankfurter recognized that the practical result
of Parker and Davis was an area of concurrent coverage, what did he
mean by "theoretic illogic"P Certainly the interpretation of section
3(a) in Parker permitted federal coverage in the field where state
compensation was constitutional. However, section 5 of the Longshoremen's Act appeared to impose exclusive liability upon the employer once federal compensation was available. Therefore, since all
state compensation statutes mposed exclusive liability upon the employer once they were applicable, theoretically there appeared to be
mutually exclusive coverage. While Justice Frankfurter yielded to
the purpose of compensation to provide relief at the expense of "theoretic illogic", Chief Justice Stone refused to yield from apparent
theoretic consistency by condemning the majority's construction of
an area of overlap by virtue of a "twilight zone
Congress by the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
I
Workers' Act has left no room for an overlapping dual system
cannot say that this section [5] does not mean what it says. If there
is liability under the federal act, that liability is exclusive. It follows
-that in any case in which compensation might have been awarded
under the federal act, a recovery under state law is in plain derogaCongress has made it
tion of the terms of the federal statute
our duty, before we sanction a recovery under state law, to ascertain
that an award under the federal act can not be had. 3 8
Id. at 260, 1942 A.M.C. at 1661.
Id. at 259, 1942 A.M.C. at 1660.
188 Id. at 261, 1942 A.M.C. at 1661-62.
136
137
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What Chief Justice Stone, Justice Frankfurter, and apparently the
entire Court failed to recognize was that Congress had left room for
an overlapping dual system consistent with the interpretation of section 3(a) in Parker because section 5 was silent on whether or not
the employer's liability was to be exclusive of any applicable state
compensation legislation. More specifically, since the Longshoremen's
Act provided federal coverage beyond the line fixing the limits of
state power without preempting state coverage, the apparent conclusiveness of section 5 never existed because the unused choice of
law test declared by Justice McReynolds m Jensen-does state legislation contravene the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress?-had come to the forefront with the enactment of a federal
compensation statute.
The use of the term "twilight zone" by the Supreme Court m order
to evade the issue of concurrent coverage constituted an abdication
of its judicial duty to provide comprehensible guidelines to compensation claimants. Not only did the "twilight zone" obscure the true
nature of the holdings m Parker and Davis, but it stimulated appellate
review of its limits with the result that new uncertainty was
intro139
duced into the adminstration of workmen's compensation.
There were other failures in the ]udicial process that greatly contributed to the declaration of a "twilight zone" m Davis, as well as
the mystic nature of the opinion m Parker, which concealed the issue
of concurrent coverage. The erroneous reliance by counsel upon prior
precedent and section 5 has already been discussed. However, Justice
Black also assumed that practical considerations dictated that there
appear to be no overlap of coverage. 140 Yet, as a practical matter the
employer would not be burdened if the employee could recover either
federal or state compensation so long as double recovery was denied.
Certainly the idea of requiring an employer to carry insurance under
both state and federal compensation schemes in order to escape all
other liability for damages at law or m admiralty appears at first
glance to be an onerous burden as well as an unnecessary duplication of
expenses. However, it is elementary that one insurance carrier, by
utilizing allocation of costs, could write a comprehensive policy that
would cover
an employer under both statutes for approximately the
14
same cost. '

139 See, e.g., Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 265 F.2d 547, 1959 A.M.C. 573,
rev'd on rehearing,267 F.2d 218, 1959 A.M.C. 2047 (5th Cir. 1957); Valley Towing
Co. v. Allen, 236 Miss. 51, 109 So. 2d 538 (1959). See Rodes, Workmen's Compensation For Maritime Employees: Obscurity In The Twilight Zone, 68 HMAv L. REv. 637
(1955).
140 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 255, 1942 A.M.C. 1653, 1657
(1942).
141 In fact, such a practice prevails today. See Gardner, Remedies For Personal
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Proper analysis of the Longshoremen's Act and proper presentation of the issue in Davs probably would have prevented the "twilight
zone from coming into existence. Conceding that federal compensation was available, counsel could have formulated the issue as being
whether or not the recovery of state compensation would contravene
the essential purpose of the Longshoremen's Act. Since its purpose
had been to provide a remedy to those precluded from state compensation, this purpose obviously was not contravened if compensation
was constitutionally available under state legislation. Clearly this
route of normal statutory interpretaton, consistent with the decisions
rendered, would have been much more preferable than the concealment in Parker and the judicial legedermam in Davis.
Although section 5 was silent on the question of an employer
being liable for state compensation even though federal compensation
was available, it did expressly state that the employer would not be
liable for damages at law if federal compensation was provided.1 4
Since concurrent coverage had inarticulately been recognized, did
this mean that an employer as defined m section 2(4) could comply
solely with the Longshoremen's Act by foregoing compliance with
state compensation legislation and thereby force an election of federal compensation upon any of his employees injured on navigable
waters? Relying again on the "twilight zone in Hahn v. Ross Island
Sand & Gravel Co.,1 43 the Supreme Court umpliedly answered that
such an employer did not have this prerogative.
In Hahn the employer had waived coverage of state compensation
and had complied only with the Longshoremen's Act. An employee
injured during dredging operations on navigable waters spurned
federal compensation and initiated a negligence suit for damages in
the state courts, which was authorized by the Oregon compensation
statute if the employer failed to comply with its compensation provisions. " Characterizing the employee as engaged in loading a vessel
on navigable waters and thus not within state coverage, the state
court dismissed on the ground that the Longshoremen's Act provided
the only remedy 1 45 In dictum, however, the state court had rejected the
Injuries To Seamen, Railroadmen, and Longshoremen, 71 HAuv. L. REv. 438, 450 n.34
(1958); Note, 50 CA=. L. Rnv. 342, 347 (1962).
For an analogous situation prorating the cost of compensation under the same
Washington statute as that involved in Davis, see Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co.
v. Department of Labor, 185 Wash. 349, 54 P.2d 1003 (1936).
14244 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
143 358 U.S. 272, 1959 A.M.C. 570 (1959).
144 ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.020 (1965).
145 "We think this is a case to which the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act clearly applies, and that compensation under it is the plaintiffs sole remedy for
his injury. [After discussing decisions sustaining federal compensation]
The case
here is even stronger, for, at the time of his injury, the plaintiff was engaged in loading
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employee's contention that if 46
the state compensation statute could
apply, it should apply in toto.1
Holding that the state could have constitutionally provided compensation because the employee was within the "twilight zone,"' 47
and the state had done so but for the employer's non-compliance, 14
the Supreme Court held that neither the Constitution nor the Longshoremen's Act precluded the employee from maintaining whatever
149
remedy was available to him under the state compensation statute.
By stating that the employee came within the "twilight zone," the Supreme Court again had esoterically expressed dissatisfaction with a
lower court's characterization of an employee. Therefore, since a
reasonable characterization of the employee's duties at the time of
his injury brought him within the state compensation statute, nothing
in the Constitution precluded coverage. But the state compensation
statute permitted suits for damages against the employer if he failed
to comply with the statute. Furthermore, the employee had asserted
in the state court that the entire statute should apply if state compensation was available.5 0 As had become its custom the Supreme Court
did not phrase such an issue. The contention of the employee was
considered, however, because the Supreme Court expressly held that
nothing in the Constitution or the Longshoremen's Act precluded the
employee from maintaining hIs negligence suit for damages.
a barge.
The loading of a vessel has a direct relation to commerce and navigation
and is not a matter of local concern." Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 214
Ore. 1, 21, 320 P.2d 668, 677, 1958 A.M.C. 1364, 1377-78 (1958).
140 "In our view, the 'twilight zone' was a contrivance
for discouraging jurisdictional disputes as between state and federal compensation laws and not as between
the Federal Compensation Law and the right to bring an action for damages under
state law.
[Ilt is urged by counsel for the plaintiff that, since the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act provides for an action against an employer who elects not to
come under the Act in which the common-law defenses are not available to the
defendant, the Act 'would apply in toto.'
We are not persuaded that such a
course would accord with the intent of Congress. Nor do we find anything in the Davis
case which supports it." Id. at 19, 320 P.2d at 676-77, 1958 A.M.C. at 1376-77.
14 7
Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 273, 1959 A.M.C. 570,
571 (1959). Since the "twilight zone" ameliorated the difficulties of overcoming the
constitutional limitations of Jensen, the fact that the Supreme Court considered the
employee within the "twilight zone" eliminated any constitutional objections that he
might otherwise have faced. In fact, the state court had implied the employee was
precluded from state coverage by its characterization of the employee's duties as loading
a vessel on navigable waters. Text and authority in note 145 supra. Once constitutional
objections to the employee's suit for damages were removed, the only remaining
obstacle was the Longshoremen's Act
148 Id. at 273, 1959 A.M.C. at 571.
149 "Since this case is within the 'twilight zone: it follows
that nothing in the
Longshoremen's Act or the United States Constitution prevents recovery." Id. at 273,
1959 A.M.C. at 571 (1959).
15o See note 146 supra.
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Properly interpreted, the precise question in Hahn was whether
or not the compensation legislation of Oregon contravened the essential purpose of the Longshoremen's Act. Since the purpose of federal
compensation was not to supplant state compensation legislation, the
decision in Hahn may be justified on the ground that an employee
should not be deprived of any remedy provided by valid state compensation legislation.
While Davis established that an employer could be liable under
either federal or state compensation for the same injury, Hahn made
it clear that an employer as defined in section 2(4) would have to
comply with both state compensation legislation and the Longshoremen's Act in order to immunize hmself from all other liability. The
only major problem that remained was whether the employee injured
within the area of overlap on navigable waters could invoke both the
federal and state compensation statutes and thereby obtain double
recovery On this question the Supreme Court's decision in 1962 in
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co. 5 ' is significant.
In Calbeck two employees had sustained injuries upon navigable
waters while engaged in the construction of launched but uncompleted vessels. Despite the fact that under the Jensen line of decisions
this type of injury was clearly within the constitutional power of a
state to provide compensation, 52 the employees mitiated federal compensation proceedings. After obtaining awards at the admmistrative
level, the Fifth Circuit adhered to mutually exclusive coverage and
set aside the awards on the ground that there was no twilight where
prior precedent was clear.'5 The Supreme Court, however, reversed'
and held that the Longshoremen's Act extends to employment injuries
on navigable waters even though a state may also constitutionally
provide compensation.'55 Therefore, Calbeck merely clarified what
had been broadly established in Parker twenty years before: the
Longshoremen's Act is applicable even if state coverage is clearly
available under the Jensen line of decisions.
151370 U.S. 114, 1962 A.M.C. 1413 (1962).
152 E.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
105 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52, 1961 A.M.C. 2008 (5th Cir. 1961).
54
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 1962 A.M.C. 1413 (1962).
155 "The Court of Appeals' interpretation of § 3(a) would, if correct, have the
effect of excepting from the Act's coverage not only the injuries suffered by employees
while engaged in ship construction but also any other injuries-even though incurred
on navigable waters and so within the reach of Congress-for which a state law could,
constitutionally, provide compensation. But the Court of Appeals' interpretation is incorrect. The history of the Act, and of § 3(a) in particular, contravenes it; and our
decisions construing § 3(a) have rejected it. Our conclusion is that Congress invoked
its constitutional power so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by
employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have
been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law:' Id. at

116-17, 1962 A.M.C. at 1415-16. (Footnote omitted.)
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In Calbeck one of the two employees had accepted voluntary state
compensation benefits and did not initiate his claim under the Longshoremen's Act until he had received substantial state benefits. 5 6
Recognizing that the Longshoremen's Act also provided compensation
coverage, the Supreme Court squarely confronted the question of
whether the employee was entitled to double recovery 57 Holding
that the acceptance of state compensation without proceeding to
an award did not estop a claim under the Longshoremen's Act, 15 the
Supreme Court held that the federal compensation award had to be
credited with the amount of benefits obtained under state compensation. 159 Therefore, Calbeck stands for the proposition that double
recovery is not permissible when the employee is injured upon navigable waters in an area of concurrent compensation coverage. Even
though the Supreme Court still has not been directed to the fact that
section 5 does not expressly exclude state compensation liability on
the part of the employer, it appears as though the tenor of Calbeck
will lead to the same conclusion.
While this analysis of Supreme Court decisions arrives at definite
conclusions regarding the significance of Parker, Davis, Hahn, and
Calbeck, it is clear that the state and lower federal courts did not
view these cases with such certainty, and much confusion and bewilderment prevailed until Calbeck. In fact, Calbeck has not completely
dispelled all confusion, 00 especially since it has been contended that
it overturned thirty-five years of precedent without any justification
other than a few excerpts of legislative intent revealed in the majority's
opinion.' 0 ' Consequently, the state and lower federal court decisions
will be reviewed only to the extent that they outline the present seaward limits of state compensation, the present landward limits of
'15 Id. at 131, 1962 A.M.C. at 1426. See Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan, 293
F.2d 51, 52, 1961 A.M.C. 2006, 2007-08 (1961).
157 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131, 1962 A.M.C. 1413, 1426
(1962).
158 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
10 Compare Camsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Company: The
Twilight's Last Gleaming?, 37 Tur. L. Bxv. 79, 87-88 (1962) (mutually exclusive coverage because state compensation has been preempted), with Note, 15 S.C.L. I~v. 982,
986-87 (1963) (Calbeck permits co-extensive concurrent coverage). See the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart m Calbeek v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 132, 1962
A.M.C. 1413, 1427 (1962) which adhered to the erroneous conception that the "twilight
zone" was a device to retain segregation between mutually exclusive compensation
schemes and concluded that the interpretation of section 3(a) by the majority had
eliminated the "twilight zone."
161 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 138, 1962 A.M.C. 1413, 1431
(1962) (dissenting opinion); Note, 1963 Dnn L.J. 327, 334 (1963); Note, 15 S.C.L.
REv. 982, 986 (1963); Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1225, 1228-29 (1963).
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federal compensation, and the problem of election of remedies which
results from concurrent coverage.
THE EXTENT OF CONCURRENT COVERAGE
The constitutional power of a state to provide compensation is
scrutinized only when the employment injury occurs within the tort
jurisdiction of admiralty 10 2 The waters included within such junsdiction are the navigable waters of the United States as well as the
high seas beyond the traditional three mile territorial limit.16 3 It is

clear that state compensation legislation which purports to operate
extraterritorially may provide relief for injuries upon the high seas
when within constitutional limits. 64 However, since the Longshoremen's Act is restricted by its terms to the navigable waters of the
United States,' 65 the physical area of concurrent coverage within the
tort jurisdiction of admiralty between federal and state compensation
is restricted to injuries or deaths upon such waters. 66
Injuries on gangplanks temporarily connecting land with vessels
are within the traditional tort jurisdiction of admiralty 167 Following
this principle injuries on gangplanks, 6 " skids,' 69 and other like structures' 70 have been held to be compensable under the Longshoremen's
Act as being injuries upon navigable waters. However, injuries on
162 E.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
163 GmoRE & B.Acx, ADnuTy § 1-11, at 28 (1957).
164 King v. Pan American World Airways, 270 F.2d 355, 1959 A.M.C. 2174 (9th
Cir. 1959), affirming 166 F Supp. 136 (N.D. Cal. 1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928
(1960); Rice v. Uwharrie Council Boy Scouts of America, 263 N.C. 204, 139 S.E.2d 223
(1964). But see Szumski v. Dale Boat Yards, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 86, 216 A.2d 256
(App. Div. 1966).
16544 Stat. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(9) (1964); 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33
U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
166 If the conclusions drawn hereto are valid, it could be contended that the Longshoremen's Act provides compensation for injuries on the high seas if state compensation
would not be constitutional. Such a contention, however, appears to be without basis
from the standpoint of congressional intent. First, the scope of the Longshoremen's Act
is expressly restricted to the territorial navigable waters of the United States. Statutes
cited note 165 supra. Second, Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
67 Stat. 463 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (1964), which incorporates the provisions of
the Longshoremen's Act to provide compensation for injuries sustained in oil drilling
on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the United States.
operations
67
1 The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 1935 A.M.C. 875 (1935). See Jensen v.
Southern Pac. Co., 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
i68 West v. Erie R.R., 163 F Supp. 879, 1959 A.M.C. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Caldaro v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 166 F Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
169 Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arren, 344 F.2d 640, 1965 A.M.C. 805 (2d Cir.
1965).
170 Byrd v. New York Cent. Sys., 6 N.J. Super. 568, 70 A.2d 97 (1949).
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docks,' 7 ' piers,172 and any other like structures 173 affixed permanently

to shore but extending over navigable waters are merely extensions
of land and not within the tort jurisdiction of admiralty Remedies
for injuries upon such structures have always been provided by state
law rather than the general maritime law 174 Decisions under the Longshoremen's Act have adhered to this principle by denying compensation for injuries sustained on piers, 175 docks, 1 " and wharves, 177 as not
being injuries upon navigable waters.
Until 1948 there was no question that "navigable waters" under the
Longshoremen's Act was equated with the traditional test to determine
the tort jurisdiction of admiralty 178 In that year Congress enacted the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 7 9 which extended the traditional tort jurisdiction of admiralty to include all injuries caused by a
vessel notwithstanding that such injury is consummated on land. 80
The question then arose whether or not the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act had likewise been impliedly expanded to include injuries
occurring upon land. Since the Extension Act neither expressly
amended nor referred to the Longshoremen's Act, the cases have
unanimously held that there has been no amendment of the Longshoremen's Act by unplication.' 8 ' Such decisions have properly been decided
in light of the fact that the existence of state compensation for injuries
upon land renders unnecessary any judicial extension of federal
coverage.
Generally, the question whether or not an injury has occurred upon
171 Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
172

E.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 1946 A.M.C. 715 (1946).

17 3 T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 1928 A.M.C. 447 (1928).

E.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
Houser v. O'Leary, 253 F Supp. 417 (D. Ore. 1966); East v. Oosting, 245 F
Supp. 51, 1965 A.M.C. 2231 (E.D. Va. 1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F Supp. 184,
1965 A.M.C. 1825 (D. Md. 1965).
7 6
1
Johnston v. Marshall, 128 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. dened, 317 U.S. 629 (1942).
177 Stansbury v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 159 So. 2d 728 (La. Ct. App.
1964).
178 E.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 1946 A.M.C. 715 (1946).
179 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
18o Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209, 1963 A.M.C. 1649, 1652
(1963).81
1 Houser v. O'Leary, 253 F Supp. 417 (D. Ore. 1966); East v. Oosting, 245 F
Supp. 51, 1965 A.M.C. 2231 (E.D. Va. 1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F Supp. 184,
1965 A.M.C. 1825 (D. Md. 1965); Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 F Supp.
881, 1963 A.M.C. 2459 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rea'd on other grounds, 354 F.2d 48 (5th
Cir. 1965); Revel v. American Export Lines, 162 F Supp. 279, 1959 A.M.C. 531 (E.D.
Va. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 82, 1959 A.M.C. 1073 (4th Cir. 1959). But see Michigan
Mut. Lab. Co. v. Amen, 233 F Supp. 496, 1964 A.M.C. 2626 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd,
344 F.2d 640, 1965 A.M.C. 805 (2d Cir. 1965).
174
175
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navigable waters is determined without difficulty However, problems
arise when the place of the initial act or omission, the place where the
force initially takes effect upon the employee, and the place of precipitation after the force has fully exerted itself do not all coincide on
navigable waters or shore, but are divided between each. Giving effect
to the purpose of compensation, decisions under the Longshoremen's
Act have sustained the recovery of federal compensation where navigable waters were either the place where the force initially took effect
upon the employee 8 2 or the place of precipitation when there was no
identifiable force other than accidental causes.'8 However, if finding
an injury upon navigable waters would preclude an action for damages
at law, courts have shown a tendency to allow the action for damages if
the place where the force took effect upon the employee was upon
shore, even though the employee was subsequently precipitated into
navigable waters. 184
The Longshoremen's Act also provides recovery for injuries or
deaths on any dry dock of the United States. 85 Since a dry dock is
constructed above or adjacent to navigable waters,' 8 such structures
7
present no problem of jurisdiction under the Longshoremen's Act.'1

However, the cases have considered whether or not a marine railway
constitutes a dry dock within the meaning of the Longshoremen's Act.
Functionally both are the same because a marine railway is also used
for the repair of existing vessels. 18 8 It differs from a dry dock, however,
in that the vessel is drawn completely out of the water and up onto the
land before repairs are started.18 9 Clearly, injuries sustained in such
repairs are within the coverage of state compensation because the
injury occurs on land, even if the employee is actually repairing the
182 Cf., Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647, 1935 A.M.C. 879 (1935);
Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R., 198 F Supp. 469 (W.D. Pa. 1958). But see O'Keeffe v.
Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965).
1831Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879, 1965 A.M.C. 1542 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. dented, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F Supp.
78, 1965 A.M.C. 1219 (E.D. Va. 1965). Cf., OKeeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 354
F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965).
184 Stott v. Thompson, 294 Ill. App. 450, 14 N.E.2d 246, cert. dented, 305 U.S. 639
(1938). See Murphy v. Boston & M.R.R., 319 Mass. 413, 65 N.E.2d 923 (1946). Cf.,
Baldwin v. Lmde-Griffith Constr. Co., 115 N.J.L. 608, 181 Ad. 35 (1935).
18544 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
186 E.g., O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571, 1965
A.M.C. 2042 (9th Cir. 1965); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 101 F.2d 732, 733, 1939
A.M.C. 129 (5th Cir. 1939).
187The Steamship Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130 (1909).
188E.g., O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571, 1965
A.M.C. 2042 (9th Cir. 1965); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 101 F.2d 732, 1939 A.M.C.
129 (5th Cir. 1939).
189 Ibid.
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ship and thus engaged in maritime employment.1 90 The question that
has been raised, however, is whether the Longshoremen's Act provides
compensation for such injuries even though not on navigable waters.
The decisions have held federal compensation is available where the
to an existing vessel 91 rather
marine railway is being used for repairs
1 92
than the construction of a new vessel.

In conclusion, the physical area of potential concurrent compensation coverage includes employment injuries or deaths upon the navigable waters of the United States, or any "drydock" as it has ]udicially
been defined under the Longshoremen's Act.
Once an employee other than a "seaman"'193 has sustained injury in
100 See Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922). Cf., Rohlfs
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 190 Wash. 566, 69 P.2d 817, 1937 A.M.C. 1026
(1937).91
1 Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366, 1953 A.M.C. 1990,
afflrming per curram 201 F.2d 437, 1953 A.M.C. 432 (5th Cir. 1953); Holland v. Harrson Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962); Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Lawson, 101 F.2d 732, 1939 A.M.C. 129 (5th Cir. 1939); Continental Cas. Co.
v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 1933 A.M.C. 794 (5th Cir. 1933). Contra, Norton v. Vesta
Coal Co., 63 F.2d 165, 1933 A.M.C. 425 (3d Cir. 1933). See Norton v. Vesta Coal Co.,
supra at 166, 1933 A.M.C. at 427 (dissenting opinion).
192 E.g., O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571, 1965 A.M.C.
2042 (9th Cir. 1965), affirmtng 224 F Supp. 557, 1964 A.M.C. 184 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
In such a case the structure is properly referred to as a "building way." O'Leary v. Puget
Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., supra at 575, 1965 A.M.C. at 2046. Contra, Port Houston
Ironworks, Inc. v. Calbeck, 227 F Supp. 966, 1964 A.M.C. 1026 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
193 Providing state compensation for injuries upon navigable waters to seamen
would work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law
wuch is supplemented by the Jones Act. Hardt v. Cuninngham, 136 N.J.L. 137, 54 A.2d
782, 1947 A.M.C. 1450 (1947). Accord, Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 186
F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1951). See note 45 supra and accompanying text. But the Supreme
Court has also established that seamen injured on land while in the service of the ship
are entitled to maintenance and cure, Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 1951
A.M.C. 416 (1951), Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 1949 A.M.C. 613 (1949),
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724, 1943 A.M.C. 451 (1943), as well as a
remedy for negligence under the Jones Act, O'Donnel v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 318 U.S. 36, 1943 A.M.C. 149 (1943). Thus seamen injured on land are not entitled to state compensation. Rudolph v. Industrial Marine Serv., Inc., 187 Tenn. 119, 213
S.W.2d 30, 1948 A.M.C. 2009 (1948); Occidental Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
24 Cal. 2d 310, 149 P.2d 841 (1944). Since seamen are also excluded from federal compensation, see text accompanying notes 59-60 supra, seamen are not entitled to revoke
either federal or state compensation regardless of where the injury occurs.
The "seaman" entitled to sue under the Jones Act has acquired a much broader
meaning than the seaman entitled only to maintenance and cure. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d
1312 (1961). Therefore, a note of caution is in order for the state claimant injured upon
land who may be a "Jones Act seaman" because state courts have held that a Jones Act
remedy precludes the benefits of state compensation. See Apperson v. Umversal Serv.,
Inc., 153 So. 2d 81 (La. Ct. App. 1963), flatly holding that a Jones Act remedy is
mutually exclusive from state compensation by overruling Beadle v. Massachusetts Bond-
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the physical area where there may be concurrent coverage, which
compensation remedy may be invoked? Basically, for the purpose of
recovering state compensation the determinative factor is the characterization of the employee at the time of his injury, while the recovery
of federal compensation is governed by the characterization of the employer. Therefore, recovery under the Longshoremen's Act is not always
available to an amphibious worker entitled to state compensationfederal and state compensation are not co-extensive in the field where
a state has constitutionally provided compensation for an injury on
navigable waters.
Failure to recognize the "twilight zone" as a label for factual determinations of state coverage at the state administrative level led to an
erroneous conclusion that state compensation was available to all employees injured on navigable waters without regard to prior precedent
which had limited state power. Such a conclusion resulted from misinterpreting Moores's and Baskin as impliedly overruling that branch of
the Jensen line of decisions which had held states could not constitutionally provide compensation to ship repairmen injured on navigable
waters. Even though Jensen itself had not been expressly overruled,
both a federal court and a state court adhered to such an interpretation and decided that the "twilight zone" enabled longshoremen injured on navigable waters to recover under the Louisiana compensation statute.194 This obliteration of all constitutional limits on state
power was quickly repudiated, 95 although not without difficulty because the true nature of the "twilight zone" remained unrecognized.9 6
The Constitution is not the only bar to valid state coverage. Longshoremen and ship repairmen are also precluded from recovering state
compensation by the Longshoremen's Act. The Longshoremen's Act
permits state coverage by virtue of congressional acceptance of the
197
Jensen line of decisions denying state coverage to such employees.
Therefore, even if Jensen and its companion cases were overruled, state
compensation would be unavailable to longshoremen and ship repairmen injured on navigable waters because there would be contravention
ng & Ins. Co., 87 So. 2d 339, 1956 A.M.C. 1213 (La. Ct. App. 1956), to the extent that
it had held there was an overlap between state compensation and a remedy under the
Jones Act.
194 See note 131 supra.
'95 Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218, 1959 A.M.C. 2047 (5th Cir.
1959), reversing on rehearing 265 F.2d 547, 1959 A.M.C. 573 (5th Cir. 1959). See
Ellis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 241 La. 433, 129 So. 2d 729 (1961), where the Supreme
Court of Louisiana mpliedly overruled Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, 95 So. 2d
830, 1957 A.M.C. 2246 (La. Ct. App. 1957) by affirming Ellis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123
So. 2d 780 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
196 Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 195; Ellis v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra
note 195.
197 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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of the essential purpose of an applicable act of Congress. However, all
amphibious workers other than longshoremen 9s or ship repairmen' 99
state compensation either on the basis of
may successfully invoke
"twilight zone."
the
or
concern"
"local
The "twilight zone" is a much broader theory than "local concern"
for sustaining an award of state compensation because it presumes the
validity of a factual determination at the state administrative level
on the question of the constitutional power of a state to provide compensation. The doctrine of 'local concern," provides less opportunity
for success upon appellate review of a state award because it involves
the actual determination of a question of constitutional law at each
step. However, "local concern" has not been entirely eliminated as a
theory for successfully invoking state compensation. If the facts of
an employee's injury fall squarely within precedent prior to Daviswhich
permitted state coverage, it is clear that such an employee is entitled
to state compensation as a matter of law 200

The "twilight zone" is the appropriate theory for obtaining a state
award where prior precedent clearly denies state coverage on similar
facts20 ' or the subject matter of the employment contract is maritime
202
in the sense that it comes within the contract jurisdiction of admiralty
The only limitation on this approach is that the injured employee
must reasonably be characterized as something other than a longshoreman per se or a ship repairman per se. Davis established that an employee does not have to be characterized as a stevedore loading or
unloading a vessel upon navigable waters merely because he is piling
steel on a barge while aiding in the dismantling of an intrastate bridge.
Moores's and Baskin established that an employee performing duties
incidental to the repair of a ship is not precluded from state coverage
by virtue of his employer's contract.
298 E.g., Robinson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 170 So. 2d 243 (La. Ct. App. 1964);
Mackey v. Standard Stevedoring Co., 131 So. 2d 123 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Caddies v.
Trenton Marine Terminal, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 125, 206 A.2d 180, 1965 A.M.C. 592 (App.

Div. 1965).
199 Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220, 1958 A.M.C. 2420 (5th Cir. 1958),

cert. denied, 359 U.S. 920 (1959); Warner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960).
200

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 351 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)

(em-

ployee engaged in construction of vessel); Seeler v. Otis Elevator Co., 281 App. Div.
140, 120 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1952)

(employee installing elevator on vessel under construc-

tion). See Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Co. v. Estes, 370 P.2d 180 (Alaska 1962);
Schacht v. Nicolaisen, 283 App. Div. 902, 129 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1954).
201 Hammond v. Albany Garage Co., 267 App. Div. 647, 47 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1944)
(characterized as refrigerator repairman rather than ship repairman).

202 "[S]Inp
on navigable waters
undergoing repairs
under a maritime
contract, and with which appellee was helping." Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v.
Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
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There have been a number of "reconversion" cases illustrating the
proposition that the characterization of the employee's duties at the
time of injury is controlling for the purpose of successfully mvoking
state compensation. In such cases employees injured on navigable
waters while actually repairmg a vessel have sought state compensation
on the ground that the subject matter of the employment was the
reconversion of a vessel rather than ordinary repairs. The rationale
of this theory is that the reconversion of a vessel is akin to new ship
construction, and that the employee is thus within the ambit of 'local
concern" defined by Rohde. Either on the theory of "local concern" or
"twilight zone," or both, state courts have sustained such a contention.

203

Where the fact situation surrounding an employee's injury on navigable waters materially differs from any prior precedent, it is virtually
certain that a factual determination at the administrative level will
result in a conclusion that state coverage is not prohibited by the Constitution. Since the subject matter of the employment in such a situation
should be non-maritime in the sense that it does not come within
the contract jurisdiction of admiralty, a reasonable characterization of
than a longshoreman or a ship rethe employee as something other
20 4
pairman should be a simple task.

The language within the cases cited provides little, if any, support to the foregoing conclusions concerning the availability of state
compensation. The primary reason for the confusion expressed in these
cases is that the "twilight zone" has been used as a label for a judicial
expedient to sustain state coverage between assumed competing compensation schemes whenever prior precedent did not preclude state
coverage on constitutional grounds. Such an expedient has provided
203 Allisot v. Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 4 N.J. 445, 73 A.2d 153 (1950);
DeGraw v. Todd Shipyards Co., 134 N.J.L. 315, 47 A.2d 338 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946);
Kelly v. R.T.C. Shipbuilding Corp., 87 N.J. Super. 313, 209 A.2d 340 (App. Div. 1965);
Emmons v. Pacific Indem. Co., 146 Tex. 496, 208 S.W.2d 884 (1948). Compare Behrle
v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 76 R.I. 106, 68 A.2d 63 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 928
(1950). In this case state compensation was applied to an employee actually repairing
a vessel not being reconverted. State coverage was upheld on the ground that there
would be no interference with maritime uniformity because the ship was a naval combat
vessel not engaged m commerce within the ordinary meaning of that term. In Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. v. Oceame Serv. Corp., 276 App. Div. 725, 97 N.Y.S.2d 401
(1950), the employment contract was characterized as a protective agency and employee
thereby a "watchman" rather than a seaman entrusted with the entire slp.
2 4
0 Arp v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 So. 2d 166 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (injured while
repossessing equipment from tug); Jones v. A. C. Steel Pier Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 176, 52
A.2d 48 (Dep't of Labor 1947) (member of "water circus" act fell overboard and
drowned); Eldredge v. Weidler, 274 App. Div. 138, 81 N.Y.S.2d 58, 1948 A.M.C. 1904
(1948) (housing construction worker drowned while responding to call for aid by employer's pleasure craft). See S. Rosenbloom, Inc. v. Willingham, 190 Md. 552, 59 A.2d
311 (1948) (industrial engineer drove off ferry and drowned).
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stability in the administration of state compensation because the only
appellate denials of state awards have been tainted with gross madequacy of presentation by counsel. 5 In fact, these latter cases indicate
that the true nature of the "twilight zone" has remained obscure
merely because incomplete analysis and maccurate presentation by
counsel have led courts confronted with confusion to seize upon any
appropriate label to sustain state coverage where the constitutional
lines were hazy
Although recovery under the Longshoremen's Act is governed by
the characterization of the employer, neither a "master or member of
a crew of any vessel" 6 nor a government employee is entitled to
such compensation.207 A determination of an employee's status in
relation to the latter exception is a sinple task. But the former exception is troublesome because it brings to the forefront a mass of apparently irreconciliable decisions which parallel the confusion engendered
20

by section 3(a) and its relation to state compensation.2 0 8 A brief sum-

mary, however, will highlight the nature of the problem and provide
general guidelines.
The proviso excluding a "master or member of a crew of any vesser'
was passed to retain the seamen's remedies under the general maritime
law and statutory right to sue for negligence under the Jones Act. The
choice of such a phrase rather than the term "seamen" reflected the
intent of Congress to preclude longshoremen from suing as seamen
under the Jones Act and provide such workers with an exclusive remedy
205

See Atlas Iron & Metal Co. v. Hesser, 177 So. 2d 199, 201-02 (1965), where
the Florida Supreme Court erroneously noted that the Jensen decision had absolutely
precluded state coverage and then concluded that Calbeok, by extending federal compensation to the full scope of federal jurisdiction which Jensen had originally defined,
had eliminated the exceptions to Jensen that had subsequently evolved; and Green v.
Simpson & Brown Constr. Co., 14 N.J. 66, 101 A.2d 10 (1953), where the New Jersey
Supreme Court twelve years earlier stated that Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S.
334, 1953 A.M.C. 237 (1953) held flatly that states were powerless to enact compensation even though the only question in that case had been which federal statute applied
to an injury on navigable waters. The Supreme Court of Florida had failed to read either
Jensen or Calbeck properly, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey had converted the
resolution of a conflict between two federal statutes into a constitutional limitation on
state power.
See also Szumski v. Dale Boat Yards, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 86, 216 A.2d 256 (App.
Div. 1966) where the state court erroneously stated that an injury upon the high seas
was within the scope of the Longshoremen's Act.
20644 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)1 (1964).
207 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)2 (1964).
208 This area is in great need of clarification, but the purpose and scope of this
comment do not include such an objective. Nevertheless, clarification should be undertaken before an inarticulate concept such as the "twilight zone" comes to the forefront.
One writer indicates he favors such an idea. See 2 LAnsoN, WonEmN's CO NSEATION
LAw §§ 90.00-.42 (1961).
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under the Longshoremen's Act. °9 Although this exclusionary proviso
continues to exclude seamen from federal compensation, much confusion has arisen because a "seaman" within the purview of the Jones
Act has acquired a much broader meaning than the layman's concept
of a seaman. 10
The Supreme Court has established that who constitutes a seaman
within the meaning of the Jones Act is a question of fact to be determined by a jury 21' The administrative determination under the Longshioremen's Act of who constitutes a "master or member of a crew" is
also factual.2 12 Since appellate review of such factual determinations

has led to a mass of case law defining both concepts, the liberal decisions under the Jones Act are invoked as defenses to federal compensation.2 13 While this presents a problem to the compensation claimant,
a factual determination m his favor will not be set aside unless unsupported by the facts. 14
Obviously, a factual determination of the employee's status under
whichever remedy is invoked provides for an area of overlap. Whichever remedy is initially invoked would appear to turn on the existence
or non-existence of fault by the employer. However, it also appears as
though counsel exploit this overlap by first obtaimng an award under
the Longshoremen's Act as not being a "master or member of a crew"
and then proceed to assert a claim as a "seaman" within the Jones

Act.215 Furthermore, such exploitation has received judicial sanction.2 16

If an employee falls within neither exclusionary proviso of section
3(a), the Supreme Court has established that such an employee is
entitled to federal compensation if his employer has any employee
employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, in the physical
area of potentially concurrent coverage.
Soon after the passage of the Longshoremen's Act an employee of
a railroad brought an action against his employer under the Federal
See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
"If the 'standing' requirements of the Jones Act are still to be regarded as having
any real content, I can find no room for debate that this individual [a worker on a "Texas
Tower"] is not a seaman, unless a 'seaman' is to mean nothing more than a person injured while working at sea." Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252, 255,
1958 A.M.C. 1014, 1017 (1958) (dissenting opinion). See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1312
(1961).
211 Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 1957 A.M.C. 891 (1957).
212 South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 1940 A.M.C. 327
(1940).
213 E.g., Daffin v. Pape, 170 F.2d 622, 1948 A.M.C. 2019 (5th Cir. 1948); Tucker
v. Norton, 56 F Supp. 61, 1944 A.M.C. 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd sub nom. Tucker
v. Branham, 151 F.2d 96, 1945 A.M.C. 1486 (3d Cir. 1945).
214 Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 1944 A.M.C. 175 (1944).
215 See Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 237 F Supp. 590, 1965 A.M.C. 553 (E.D.
Va. 1965), rev'd, 360 F.2d 360, 1966 A.M.C. 578 (4th Cir. 1966).
216 Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 360 F.2d 360, 1966 A.M.C. 578 (4th Cir. 1966).
209
210
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for an injury sustained while loading
Employers' Liability Act
freight into cars located on a car float lying in navigable waters. The
Supreme Court held that the Longshoremen's Act provided the only
remedy and dismissed the damage suit.218 Since the employee had been
characterized as engaging in a maritime activity by virtue of the fact
that he was loading freight on navigable waters, 219 the decision appeared to leave open the question whether or not an employee had
to be engaged in a maritime activity in order to obtain federal compensation.
This question was squarely raised before the Supreme Court
twenty years later in PennsylvaniaR.R. Co. v. O'Rourke.2 2 ° In that case
the action was also brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
by an employee of a railroad injured on a car float lying in navigable
waters. Contrary to the prior case, this employee had clearly been
engaged in "railroad work" because he was injured while releasing
the hand brakes of box cars so that they could be pulled off the float
by an engine. 221 Nevertheless the district court dismissed the action on
the ground that the Longshoremen's Act provided the exclusive
remedy 222 After the circuit court had reversed 2" on the ground that
the Federal Employers' Liability Act covered railroad employees while
engaged in railroad work on navigable waters, 224 the Supreme Court
reversed and reinstated the decision of the district court.
The contention of the employee in O'Rourke was that he was engaged in "railroad work" rather than "loading" on navigable waters, and
thereby not engaged in maritime employment. 225 The Supreme Court
rejected this contention on the ground that the characterization of the
employer, not the employee, was controlling:
the emphasis on the nature of respondent's duties here misses the
mark. The statute applies, by its own terms, to accidents on navigable
waters when the employer has any employees engaged in maritime
service.
Besides [section 2(4)] is directed at the employer when
it speaks of maritime employment, not at the work the employee is
The Court of Appeals, we -think,is in error in holding that
doing.
the statute requires, as to the employee, both injury on navigable
employment as a ground for coverage by the
waters and maritime
Compensation Act. 226
21735 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
218 Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S. 128, 1930 A.M.C. 763 (1930).
219 Id. at 134, 1930 A.M.C. at 766-67.
220 344 U.S. 334, 1953 A.M.C. 237 (1953).
221 Id. at 334-35, 1953 A.M.C. at 238.
222 O'Rourke v. Pennsylvama R.R., 99 F Supp. 506, 1951 A.M.C. 2090 (E.D.N.Y.
1951).
223 O'Rourke v. Pennsylvarna R.R., 194 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1952).
224 Id. at 615.
225 Pennsylvama R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 339, 1953 A.M.C. 237, 242 (1953).
226 Id. at 339-40, 1953 A.M.C. at 242.
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O'Rourke was a 5-4 decision. But the split merely reflects the disover the characterization of the employer,
agreement of the Court
22 7
through his employee.

Whatever doubt existed subsequent to O'Rourke was formally
interred m Calbeck. In that case employees injured upon navigable
waters while engaged in new ship construction were entitled to recover federal compensation. Clearly such employees were not maritime
employees. Furthermore, the Court assumed that the employers came
within the terms of section 2(4).228 Therefore, it is settled that for

the purpose of obtaining federal compensation it is the characterization
of the employer, not the employee, that defines the scope of recovery
This also makes clear that not every employee injured on navigable
waters can obtain federal 'compensation.
From the foregoing it is clear that an employee injured in the
physical area of potentially concurrent coverage has an election of
compensation remedies only if he satisfies three conditions precedent:
(1) state compensation legislation may constitutionally apply; (2) the
employee does not come within either exclusion of section 3(a) of the
Longshoremen's Act; and (3) the employer comes within the terms
of section 2(4) of the Longshoremen's Act.
Unless the state may constitutionally provide compensation, there
is no problem of election of remedies. In such a situation any proceedngs under state legislation would not preclude an injured worker
from subsequently invoking federal compensation successfully Since
the state tribunal would be without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
it could not divest coverage under the Longshoremen's Act.229 However,
if a state tribunal erroneously assumed jurisdiction, a federal court may
not enjoin such proceedings even if an award would not be constitutional.230
If an employee has an election of compensation remedies, stability
in the administration of compensation requires that a binding election
be made at some time. Of course, the statute of limitations of one
year for filing under the Longshoremen's Act provides an initial safeguard against abuse.23i However, the liberal view is that a state claim
tolls the federal statute during the period of adjudication. 2 Another
limit on the power of an election is a voluntary waiver or release validly
Id. at 342, 1953 A.M.C. at 244 (dissenting opinion).
228 Calbeek v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 117 n.4, 1962 A.M.C. 1413, 1415
n.4 (1962).
229 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968
227

(4th Cir. 1951).

Smith & Son v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397, 1960 A.M.C. 1296 (5th Cir. 1960).
Stat. 1432 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1964).
'Wilson v. Donovan, 218 F Supp. 944, 1964 A.M.C. 120 (E.D. La. 1963).
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The final limitation upon the power of an election should
to an award,
be that once a claim is voluntarily initiated and brought
23 This principle
electon.
an
such
by
bound
the claimant should be
has been followed despite statements to the contrary 25 However,
mere voluntary acceptance of state compensation benefits does not preclude resorting to the Longshoremen's Act as long as a6 federal award
is credited with the amount of state benefits received.2
CONCLUSION
Jensen was the high point m the expression of a philosophy that
the substantive maritime law incorporated into the Constitution could
be applied uniformly only if not impaired by the exercise of state
power. Unfortunately, the victim of this idealistic philosophy was the
recently accepted philosophy of providing compensation to all employees injured in the conduct of a business enterprise by imposing
liability without fault upon the employer for such injuries. As a result
of this clash between two philosophies, the socially desirable remedy
of compensation was unavailable to a large group of persons engaged
in rather hazardous employment.
After two unsuccessful attempts to authorize state coverage for such
workers, Congress enacted a federal compensation statute to provide
the benefits of compensation to those workers that could not constitutionally obtain state coverage. While the congressional purpose was
clear, the language of the statute was imprecise. This deficiency, however, would later be a blessing in disguise because the judiciary initially
construed the Longshoremen's Act in accord with the congressional
intent to provide compensation only when a state was constitutionally
powerless to do so. This course of judicial interpretation, however, soon
frustrated the purpose of compensation to provide quick and certain
relief because constitutional questions regarding the extent of state
power were raised in virtually all claims for injuries upon navigable
waters regardless whether state or federal compensation was initially
invoked. Furthermore, appellate review of administrative decisions
was certain if there was no similar prior precedent. However, slight
factual distinctions from prior precedent also formed the basis of constitutional questions concerning state power.
233

Comeaux v. Two-R Drilling Co., 236 F Supp. 735, 1965 A.M.C. 1058 (E.D. La.

1964).
23 4
For an especially interesting theory framed m terms of "vesting," see Dunleavy
v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343 (Hudson County Ct.
1951).
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See Gulf Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe, 242 F Supp. 881, 1965 A.M.C. 1048 (E.D.S.C.

1965).

236 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 1962 A.M.C. 1413 (1962); Beasley
v. O'Hearne, 250 F Supp. 49, 1966 A.M.C. 1250 (S.D.W Va. 1966).
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Against this background, the Supreme Court, led by Justice Black,
rendered two decisions within the space of one year which significantly
altered the socially intolerable situation that prevailed. Seizing upon
the inprecise language in section 3(a) which apparently limited the
scope of federal coverage to that field where states were powerless,
Justice Black in Parker eliminated all questions of constitutional law
concerning state power in proceedings under the Longshoremen's Act.
The interpretation given to the scope of federal coverage was that it
extended beyond the line fixing the limits of state power but did not
preempt or encroach upon constitutionally valid state compensation.
In Darns Justice Black reduced appellate review fixing the limits of
state power by converting a question of constitutional law decided at
appellate levels into a question of fact to be decided with virtual
finality at the state administrative level. Thus, without overruling
Jensen and its companion cases, appellate review in claims for state
compensation would nevertheless be reduced to a minimum.
Despite the desirability of such innovations, and their need to be
expressed clearly, the Supreme Court indulged in articulating a "twilight zone" in order to retain the appearance of mutually exclusive
coverage presumably necessitated by the fact that both state and
federal compensation statutes purported to impose exclusive liability
upon the employer. Thus, stability of compensation administration
did not reach a maximum because some claimants attempted to explore
the limits of a "twilight zone." However, courts did seize upon the
label of a "twilight zone" as a judicial expedient to maximize validation of awards obtained at the administrative levels, and thereby
achieve greater stability than existed prior to Parker and Davis.
This development in the stability of compensation led to the
actual expression in Calbeck of the concurrent coverage which previously had existed. Thus, with the exception of seamen who come
under no compensation legislation, virtually all amphibious employees
injured upon navigable waters with the exception of longshoremen
and ship repairmen are entitled to an election of compensation remedies.
Two factors stand out in the development since the opinions of
Justice Black in Parker and Davis. First, the subtle use of the term
"exclusive" by the judiciary in order to retain the appearance of mutually exclusive coverage. By stating that a compensation statute
provided the "exclusive" remedy, courts concealed whether the term
was being used as a synonym for "only" or merely descriptive of the
exclusive liability provision prevailing in all compensation statutes.
With this kept in mind many opinions become intelligible that otherwise would not be.
The other factor that stands out is the failure of any counsel to
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bring to the attention of any court the fact that congressional action
covering all muries on navigable waters did not necessarily constitute
preemption of state coverage. If such a presentation was made, counsel
must not have pointed out that the exclusive liability provision of the
Longshoremen's Act does not expressly preclude state coverage. Either
of these failures, or both, by counsel have forced the courts to resort
to concepts such as the "twilight zone" to allow the existence in fact of
something apparently impossible.
In conclusion, despite the ambiguity of courts in this area and the
maze of techmcal niceties, it is incredible that a formal structure can
be set forth that embraces the actual decisions made in the field of
workmen's compensation for injuries upon navigable waters.

